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ABSTRACT
System-on-chip design is becoming increasingly complex as technology scaling
enables more and more functionality on a chip. This scaling-driven complexity
has resulted in a variety of reliability and validation challenges including logic
bugs, hot spots, wear-out, and soft errors. To make matters worse, as we
reach the limits of Dennard scaling, efforts to improve system performance
and energy efficiency have resulted in the integration of a wide variety of
complex hardware accelerators in SoCs. Thus the challenge is to design
complex, custom hardware that is efficient, but also correct and reliable.
High-level synthesis shows promise to address the problem of complex
hardware design by providing a bridge from the high-productivity software
domain to the hardware design process. Much research has been done on
high-level synthesis efficiency optimizations. This dissertation shows that
high-level synthesis also has the power to address validation and reliability
challenges through three automated solutions targeting three key stages in the
hardware design and use cycle: pre-silicon debugging, post-silicon validation,
and post-deployment error detection.
Our solution for rapid pre-silicon debugging of accelerator designs is hybrid
tracing : comparing a datapath-level trace of hardware execution with a
reference software implementation at a fine temporal and spatial granularity
to detect logic bugs. An integrated backtrace process delivers source-code
meaning to the hardware designer, pinpointing the location of bug activation
and providing a strong hint for potential bug fixes. Experimental results show
that we are able to detect and aid in localization of logic bugs from both
C/C++ specifications as well as the high-level synthesis engine itself.
A variation of this solution tailored for rapid post-silicon validation of
accelerator designs is hybrid hashing : inserting signature generation logic
in a hardware design to create a heavily compressed signature stream that
captures the internal behavior of the design at a fine temporal and spatial
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granularity for comparison with a reference set of signatures generated by
high-level simulation to detect bugs. Using hybrid hashing, we demonstrate
an improvement in error detection latency (time elapsed from when a bug
is activated to when it manifests as an observable failure) of two orders
of magnitude and a threefold improvement in bug coverage compared to
traditional post-silicon validation techniques. Hybrid hashing also uncovered
previously unknown bugs in the CHStone benchmark suite, which is widely
used by the HLS community. Hybrid hashing incurs less than 10% area
overhead for the accelerator it validates with negligible performance impact,
and we also introduce techniques to minimize any possible intrusiveness
introduced by hybrid hashing.
Finally, our solution for post-deployment error detection is modulo-3 sha-
dow datapaths: performing lightweight shadow computations in modulo-3
space for each main computation. We leverage the binding and scheduling
flexibility of high-level synthesis to detect control errors through diverse
binding and minimize area cost through intelligent checkpoint scheduling and
modulo-3 reducer sharing. We introduce logic and dataflow optimizations to
further reduce cost. We evaluated our technique with 12 high-level synthesis
benchmarks from the arithmetic-oriented PolyBench benchmark suite using
FPGA emulated netlist-level error injection. We observe coverages of 99.1%
for stuck-at faults, 99.5% for soft errors, and 99.6% for timing errors with a
25.7% area cost and negligible performance impact. Leveraging a mean error
detection latency of 12.75 cycles (4150× faster than end result check) for soft
errors, we also explore a rollback recovery method with an additional area
cost of 28.0%, observing a 175× increase in reliability against soft errors.
While the area cost of our modulo shadow datapaths is much better
than traditional modular redundancy approaches, we want to maximize the
applicability of our approach. To this end, we take a dive into gate-level
architectural design for modulo arithmetic functional units. We introduce new
low-cost gate-level architectures for all four key functional units in a shadow
datapath: (1) a modulo reduction algorithm that generates architectures
consisting entirely of full-adder standard cells; (2) minimum-area modulo
adder and subtractor architectures; (3) an array-based modulo multiplier
design; and (4) a modulo equality comparator that handles the residue
encoding produced by the above.
We compare our new functional units to the previous state-of-the-art
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approach, observing a 12.5% reduction in area and a 47.1% reduction in delay
for a 32-bit mod-3 reducer; that our reducer costs, which tend to dominate
shadow datapath costs, do not increase with larger modulo bases; and that for
modulo-15 and above, all of our modulo functional units have better area and
delay then their previous counterparts. We also demonstrate the practicality
of our approach by designing a custom shadow datapath for error detection
of a multiply accumulate functional unit, which has an area overhead of only
12% for a 32-bit main datapath and 2-bit modulo-3 shadow datapath.
Taking our reliability solution further, we look at the bigger picture of
modulo shadow datapaths combined with other solutions at different ab-
straction layers, looking to answer the following question: Given all of the
existing reliability improvement techniques for application-specific hardware
accelerators, what techniques or combinations of techniques are the most
cost-effective? To answer this question, we consider a soft error fault model
and empirically evaluate cross-layer combinations of ABFT, EDDI, and mod-
ulo shadow datapaths in the context of high-level synthesis; parity in logic
synthesis; and flip-flop hardening techniques at the physical design level. We
measure the reliability benefit and area, energy, and performance cost of each
technique individually and for interesting technique combinations through
FPGA emulated fault-injection and physical place-and-route. Our results
show that a combination of parity and flip-flop hardening is the most cost-
effective in general with an average 1.3% area cost and 5.7% energy cost for a
50× improvement in reliability. The addition of modulo-3 shadow datapaths
to this combination provides some additional benefit for some applications,
even without considering its combinational logic, stuck-at fault, and timing
error protection benefits. We also observe new efficiency challenges for ABFT
and EDDI when used for hardware accelerators.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Designing hardware is hard.1 A system designer chooses a custom hardware
design when a pure software solution is inadequate for power consumption
and/or performance reasons. Thus problems that require a hardware solution
already come with demanding power and performance constraints. With the
end of Dennard scaling, improvements in power consumption and performance
for microprocessor-based software platforms have slowed down, pushing more
and more system designers to custom hardware solutions.
The result is an explosion in system complexity with increasing effort
and chip area dedicated to custom hardware on SoCs. To make matters
worse, designers often have additional constraints: limited time to get into a
market, complex functionality demanded by that market, and limited chip
area budgets due to fabrication costs.
As if this were not enough, the continuation of Moore’s law scaling has
resulted in new hardware reliability problems. Reliably operating billions
of transistors is not easy when power “brown outs” start occurring and
thermal hot spots start forming as transistors are packed closer together.
Reliably fabricating smaller wires and devices is also not easy, resulting in
more permanent defects. Smaller devices are more vulnerable to particle
strikes, which manifest as soft errors. Physical effects cause smaller transistors
to wear out, resulting in longer gate propagation delays leading to timing
errors after prolonged use. All of this does not even consider that designers
themselves, without needing any help from circuit physics, are more than
capable of creating their own logic bugs to trip over in their complex designs.
Clearly, there is a need for effective methods to manage the complexity of
hardware design. High-level synthesis, also known as behavioral synthesis, is
one such approach. HLS provides a bridge from the high-productivity software
paradigm to the hardware design process, enabling hardware designers to
1That is why it is called hardware.
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create behavioral specifications of their design in dialects of traditionally
software languages. HLS frees hardware designers from the tedious details of
hardware resource allocation, scheduling, and binding, allowing them to focus
on meeting design requirements and designing effective hardware algorithms.
From a research point of view, starting from a behavioral specification pro-
vides the synthesis engine with richer information about the behavior and
architecture of a design, enabling scheduling and binding optimization poten-
tial not possible with RTL design entry, and giving the synthesis engine more
freedom to exploit this flexibility to meet multiple optimization goals.
In this thesis, we discuss our research to leverage this power of HLS to
address the aforementioned hardware validation and reliability problems
through three automated solutions, targeting three key stages of the hardware
design and use cycle.
In Chapter 5, we propose the insertion of non-synthesizable instrumentation
into an HLS-generated hardware design to capture a trace of internal behavior
at a fine spatial and temporal granularity in hardware (RTL) simulation.
By comparing this trace with a software version generated to produce the
same result, we show that logic bug detection is possible for both bugs in the
hardware specification source and in the HLS engine. Furthermore, through
the use of debugging metadata, we show that this technique can pinpoint
the line where a source-code bug resides. This technique also leverages co-
simulation to use high-level language simulation for parts of the design not
being directly tested. HLS is critical here because it identifies key RTL
variables that have source-code meaning, avoiding the deluge of data from an
RTL-level value change dump.
In Chapter 6, we propose the insertion of signature generation logic into a
fabricated hardware design to create a heavily compressed signature stream
that captures the internal behavior of the design during post-silicon validation
at a fine temporal and spatial granularity. By comparing the generated
sequence of signatures to a reference set generated by high-level simulation,
we can detect both logic and electrical bugs in hardware designs. HLS also
plays a critical role here by identifying important variables to capture and
enabling the sharing of expensive signature generation logic.
In Chapter 7, we propose creating a redundant, but smaller “shadow”
datapath based on modulo arithmetic to detect reliability problems in a
design’s main datapath. HLS is critical here because it provides a clear
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picture of the datapath of the design and enables effective sharing of expensive
checksum computing resources.
In Chapter 8, we take a dive into gate-level optimization to further optimize
these shadow datapaths, exploring new gate-level algorithms and architectural
templates for modulo arithmetic functional units with the goal of automating
the generation of these units. We show that the use of these new functional
units reduces shadow datapath cost, and enables practical scaling to larger
shadow datapath widths for improved error detection effectiveness.
In Chapter 9, we take shadow datapaths further by looking for cross-layer
synergies with techniques for improving soft-error reliability ranging from
the algorithm to the physical design level. By combining techniques, we can
exploit the strength of each technique while compensating for weaknesses. As a
side effect, this chapter explores the effectiveness of algorithm and instruction
level techniques when applied in the context of high-level synthesis.
Before these main chapters, we will provide some background on the
reliability and validation problems hardware designers face in the rest of this
chapter, introduce important concepts used in our work in Chapter 2, and
discuss related work in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 introduces the concept of hybrid
error detection, which creates the foundation for Chapters 5 and 6. We end
with concluding remarks in Chapter 10.
This thesis is based on our three publications in the IEEE/ACM Design
Automation Conferences of 2015 and 2016: “High-Level Synthesis of Error
Detecting Cores through Low-Cost Modulo-3 Shadow Datapaths” [1], “Hybrid
Quick Error Detection (H-QED): Accelerator Validation and Debug Using
High-Level Synthesis Principles” [2], and “Debugging and Verifying SoC
Designs through Effective Cross-Layer Hardware-Software Co-Simulation” [3].
Chapter 9 is based on a publication to appear in TECHCON 2017: “Cost-
Effective Cross-Layer Resilience for Hardware Accelerators” [4].
1.1 Root Causes for Hardware Failure
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the hardware engineering process, which
consists of the following steps:
1. The designer writes a Verilog and/or VHDL description of the design.
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Figure 1.1: The hazards inherent in designing custom hardware.
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For improved productivity, the designer may also elect to specify design
blocks at the behavioral level in SystemC or the HLS-tool’s proprietary
C dialect.
2. The designer simulates behavioral design blocks using a software com-
piler.
3. The designer uses a high-level synthesis tool to generate an RTL imple-
mentation of behavioral design blocks.
4. The test engineer runs the resulting RTL implementations through an
RTL simulation tool.
5. The designer runs the RTL blocks through logic synthesis to generate a
technology mapped gate netlist.
6. The test engineer may simulate the netlist with a netlist simulation
tool. Simulation at this stage is very slow.
7. The designer runs the gate netlist through a placement and routing
engine, which produces a physical design.
8. The test engineer may simulate the physical design with a chip simula-
tion that takes wire and gate delays into account. This simulation is
extremely slow.
9. The designer sends the physical design to a foundry, which fabricates
the chip.
10. Test engineers test the actual hardware to verify that it meets specifica-
tions and validate that it implements the correct design.
11. Hardware that passes post-silicon testing is sent to end-users who deploy
it in their systems.
Figure 1.1 also shows what can go wrong during the hardware engineering
process, which we now discuss in the following subsections.
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1.1.1 Logic Bugs
Logic bugs are mistakes that the hardware designer makes in writing the
C or RTL version of a design that cause it to function in violation of the
design specification. Most of these bugs are caught in high-level simulation
or RTL simulation. Due to the complexities of system design, it is difficult to
design these tests such that they exercise every possible interaction between
a design block under test and other design blocks around it. Thus some logic
bugs escape high-level and RTL simulation and can make it into the physical
design. Some of those bugs evade detection in post-silicon testing and survive
all the way to deployment. We define two primary classes of logic bugs:
 Deterministic logic bugs have well-defined behavior that is not com-
piler or synthesis tool dependent. For input languages with well-defined
standards, semantics that are defined in the standard are deterministic
for tools that conform to the standard. An example of a deterministic
logic bug is a memory copy operation for input data that simultane-
ously (for faster performance) copies the first half of an input array
to both halves of an output array when the programmer intended to
copy corresponding halves of the whole input array to the whole output
array.
 Non-deterministic logic bugs do not have well-defined behavior; the
behavior can depend on the compiler or synthesis tool used, how the
tool was configured, what environment the tool was run in or the design
was tested in, and even other parts of the design that are seemingly
unrelated; the behavior of these bugs can depend on almost anything!
For input languages with well-defined standards, non-deterministic
semantics may be specified as resulting in “undefined behavior.” An
example of a non-deterministic logic bug is a read from uninitialized
memory.
1.1.2 Hot Spots
Hot spots are regions on a chip that exceed local heat dissipation capacity
and/or power supply capacity under certain operating conditions. Hot spots
happen when a large amount of transistor switching activity is concentrated
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in a small region of a chip. An excess current demand that lasts long enough
causes voltage drops on power supply wires, resulting in longer than expected
transistor delays. High power consumption exceeding the thermal dissipation
capability of a region of a chip that lasts long enough results in excess heat
that causes the transistors in that region, which are not designed to operate
at high temperature, to slow down. The net effect is that signal propagation
delays increase, leading to timing errors (defined in Section 1.2.1).
1.1.3 Fabrication Defects
Fabrication defects result in gates implementing the wrong logic function (or
being permanently bypassed) due to wire or transistor fabrication failures.
These permanent defects typically manifest as stuck-at faults: wires that are
supposed to be the output of a logic gate are stuck at logic 0 or logic 1 and
never change regardless of circuit input.
1.1.4 Soft Errors
Soft errors are caused by a particle striking a transistor with enough energy
and the right timing to cause bit-flips in storage elements including flip-flops,
SRAM cells, and DRAM cells. The victim transistor can be part of the
storage element or an upstream gate that propagates a resulting logic glitch.
These particles are typically part of a shower of particles that results when
a cosmic ray strikes the Earth’s atmosphere. Thus these events are random
and unpredictable in nature.
1.1.5 Wear Out
Like mechanical systems, MOSFETs can wear out from prolonged, heavy use.
High-energy charge carriers can build up over time in a MOSFET’s insulating
dielectric, increasing the threshold voltage which causes the transistor to
switch more slowly. Bias temperature instability (BTI) is another effect that
can charge the insulating dielectric over time, although some of its effects
are temporary [5]. Like hot spots, both of these problems can lead to timing
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errors (defined in Section 1.2.1). Unlike hot spots, these aging effects can
take years to develop.
Worse problems can occur when the dielectric layer breaks down, which
can result in a short that causes a permanent failure of a transistor. Another
effect called electromigration causes atoms in wires to slowly “flow” down-
stream, thinning the wire upstream until it becomes a permanent open circuit
defect [5].
1.2 Root Cause Effects
The effects of many of the above root causes are predictable enough that
they can be modeled. For each effect, there are activation conditions, or
conditions required for the effect to occur. More precisely, an activation
condition is the condition required for an error, fault, or bug to change the
internal behavior of a design. Thus if an error, fault, or bug is not activated,
then it is undetectable even with perfect observability of the internal behavior
of a design.
1.2.1 Timing Errors
Power and thermal hot spots, charge carrier injection, and bias temperature
instability all result in transistors switching more slowly than they normally
would. The result is that signal propagation delays along chains of gates
increase, resulting in a signal taking so long to propagate from a launch
flip-flop to a latch flip-flop that it misses the latch window. The result is that
the wrong value can be latched at the latch flip-flop; when this occurs it is
known as a timing error.
We can model this timing error as a bit flip at the latch flip-flop, given
these four activation conditions for a timing error to occur along a given
combinational path at a given cycle from a launch flip-flop to a latch flip-flop:
1. The sum of the arrival time of the launch flip-flop output and delays of
each gate along the path must exceed the required arrival time for the
latch flip-flop input.
2. The path must be sensitized, meaning that all logic values are such that
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a flip in the logic value of the launch flip-flop results in a flip along each
segment of the path up to and including the latch flip-flop.
3. The launch flip-flop toggles at the given cycle.
4. The latch flip-flop latches the wrong value. Favorable glitches may cause
the latch flip-flop to latch an intermediate value that happens to be
correct even though the final value arrives too late.
1.2.2 Stuck-at Faults
Fabrication defects result in gate outputs being stuck at either a 0 or a 1. The
more dramatic wear-out problems that cause permanent defects can also have
this effect. Modeling these faults is straightforward: disconnect a net from its
original driver and connect it to a constant logic 0 or 1 instead. Stuck-at 0
(1) faults have one activation condition, which is that the input logic values
to the gate with the stuck-at fault are such that the output should be 1 (0).
The result is an internally detectable deviation in the behavior of a design.
1.2.3 Soft Errors
Soft errors cause random logic values to be injected into storage elements
of a design, overwriting the previous value. For this event to be internally
observable, the activation condition is that the value injected must differ from
the value that would otherwise be latched at the storage element at the time
of injection. Thus we model these events as random bit-flips at random cycles
in randomly selected storage elements, using the value that would normally
be latched as the reference for the flip.
1.2.4 Logic Bugs
While logic bug activation conditions and effects are in general more difficult
to pin down than the above electrical bug scenarios, they still exist. Logic
bugs have activation conditions, which are the conditions under which the
internal behavior of a design deviates from what the designer expects, and
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effects, which are the actual behavior of the bug as compared to a designer’s
expectations.
1.3 Error Propagation
When an error, fault, or bug is activated, it has by definition begun to
change the internal behavior of a circuit. This change in behavior is not
necessarily externally observable, however. Errors that are activated have
multiple possible outcomes:
 The error effects are masked before they affect any output of the
circuit. This means the error changes the internal behavior of the circuit
temporarily, but that eventually, the circuit reverts to behaving as if
the error had never activated. Externally (i.e. observing the circuit
outputs), there is no way to know a masked error has activated. An
example of a masked error is a value that is computed incorrectly, but
is then ignored because it is not selected by a multiplexer.
 The error effects change the output of the circuit. In this case, we say
that the error is unmasked.
 For effects that are not quickly masked or unmasked but instead make it
to internal storage elements, there can be a third “limbo” state known
as silent data corruption. In this state, the error has changed the
internal behavior of the circuit, but whether the error will be masked or
unmasked depends on the next access to the corrupted storage elements.
For example, the corrupted elements may be overwritten, in which case
the error becomes masked or the corrupted elements may be read and
outputted, in which case the error becomes unmasked. Since data can
be stored in memory indefinitely, there is no limit to how long silent
data corruption can last.
While unmasked errors are clearly the most problematic, one should be careful
about considering masked errors to be benign. In the same way that errors
have activation conditions, errors are also sensitive to masking conditions that
can turn a masked error into an unmasked one. A particularly insidious case
is a masking condition that causes an error to be masked in testing mode,
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but unmasked in production mode. Thus for circuit validation, increasing
observability to detect masked errors is also important.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
Each of the sections in this chapter provides some useful background infor-
mation for the convenience of the reader who may be unfamiliar with some
of the concepts in the chapters that follow.
2.1 Execution Signatures
A software program contains variables that will have dynamic values during
the program execution. Similarly, a hardware design has storage elements
such as flip-flops that will have dynamic values during hardware execution.
An execution signature is a hashed trace of the dynamic value of variables
during software or hardware execution. Comparing the trace of hardware to
be validated with a reference execution trace is a useful way to catch bugs.
As one might imagine, tracing all variables at all times during software or
hardware execution is expensive. We can use the following complementary
techniques to reduce that cost:
1. Select a subset of all variables to trace. This reduces overhead, but also
observability.
2. Create a diverse tracing schedule (i.e. different variables are traced in
different execution states). This allows tracing resources such as buffers
and I/O ports to be shared, reducing overhead.
3. Hash some of the traced variables. In order for the hash to be repro-
ducible to detect errors, the values of the traced variable must be known
(i.e. if there is an unknown or “x” value, then the hash cannot be
reproduced and false bug detection positives will occur).
4. Compute a running hash to combine variables across cycles. Again all
of the values that go into this running hash must be known.
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In Chapter 6, we use all four of these techniques, and hash all of the traced
variables to detect errors, using the high-level synthesis binding solution to
identify when register values are known.
2.1.1 Catching Logic Bugs
If a design contains a non-deterministic logic bug and is run in a reference
simulation and in hardware, the dynamic trace of the variable values will
likely be different. The simulation would involve a different process (e.g.
compilation by a high-level C compiler) than the hardware synthesis process,
so the undefined behavior would likely manifest itself differently. For example,
the values stored in uninitialized memory in hardware could be the device
physics dependent power-on state, while uninitialized memory in a reference
simulation might contain values from when it was used by another software
process.
If a design only contains deterministic logic bugs and the simulation and
synthesis tools correctly interpret the input code, the dynamic hardware and
reference trace of the variable values will be identical. Thus hybrid comparison
techniques will not catch deterministic logic bugs. The good news is that
due to their deterministic nature, these bugs are easily reproducible in both
hardware and reference executions. Furthermore, for hardware designs written
in software input languages, we can leverage traditional software debugging
techniques to debug hardware designs.
2.1.2 Hash Functions
In order to minimize hardware cost, we select the following xor-based hash
functions:
H(x1, x2, ..., xn) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ ...⊕ xn (2.1)
Sn =
H0 ⊕ C if n = 0Hn ⊕ rotate(Sn−1, r) if n > 0 (2.2)
where H is the reduction function that reduces a set of multi-bit variable
values (technique 3 above) to a single hash. Similarly, Sn is the running hash
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that combines the values of H across execution cycles (technique 4 above)
(H in cycle n is denoted Hn). The function rotate(v, r) denotes bit rotation
to the left of the bit vector v by r bits. C and r are constants. In Chapter 6,
we refer to the hardware that implements these hash functions as an XOR
tree and an LFSR, respectively.
Both of these functions have the desirable property that a change in any
bit of the input variables will result in a change in at least one bit of the
output. Equation (2.2) has the additional desirable property that Sn depends
on the number of cycles that have passed, n, even if all Hn = 0.
2.2 Modulo Arithmetic
Modulo-b arithmetic is arithmetic defined in a finite field with b possible values,
where each possible value corresponds to a remainder when an integer is
divided by b (using Euclidean division so that remainders are always positive).
Addition, subtraction, and multiplication are defined with “wraparound”
arithmetic where the result is immediately divided by b and the remainder
taken as the result.
For example, in modulo-3 space the possible values are {0, 1, 2} and 2+2 = 1
since in integer space (2 + 2) mod 3 = 1 where a mod b is the remainder after
dividing a by b. Table 2.1 shows the mapping from integer space to modulo-
3 space and Table 2.2 provides the modulo-3 addition, subtraction, and
multiplication tables.
2.2.1 Properties
Since equivalent lightweight computations can be performed in modulo space
as in integer space, modulo arithmetic can be used as a way to independently
check integer computation. This works because we have defined a homomor-
phism from integer arithmetic to modulo arithmetic. In other words, given inte-
gers {x, y, z} and corresponding modulo variables {x′, y′, z′} = {x, y, z} mod b
we observe the following properties:
x + y = z =⇒ x′ + y′ = z′ (mod b) (2.3)
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Table 2.1: Integer to Modulo-3 Space Mapping
Integer value -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Modulo-3 value 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0
Table 2.2: Modulo-3 Addition, Subtraction, and Multiplication Tables
+ 0 1 2
0 0 1 2
1 1 2 0
2 2 0 1
− 0 1 2
0 0 2 1
1 1 0 2
2 2 1 0
× 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2
2 0 2 1
x− y = z =⇒ x′ − y′ = z′ (mod b) (2.4)
xy = z =⇒ x′y′ = z′ (mod b) (2.5)
where (mod b) next to an equation indicates that the arithmetic is performed
in modulo-b space. Thus for Equations (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), z′ can be indepen-
dently computed two ways: by mapping z to modulo space or by mapping x′
and y′ to modulo space and performing the “shadow computation” in each
equation.
Note that this “shadow computation” property holds for arbitrarily complex
integer arithmetic involving addition, subtraction, and multiplication. For
example, x2−4xy+2y2 = z =⇒ x′2−x′y′+2y′2 = z′ (mod b). Exploiting the
ability of homomorphisms such as this integer to modulo-b mapping to scale
to arbitrarily complex expressions is the key to implementing cost-effective
error detection.
2.2.2 Aliasing
When using modulo-b arithmetic as an error detection technique, aliasing
occurs when the integer result of an erroneous computation corresponds to
the same modulo-b checksum as the correct result. For example, for modulo-3
arithmetic, if the correct integer result of a computation is 5, but the value -4
is produced instead since both values map to 2 in modulo-3 space (Table 2.1)
the error may not be detected since the correct “checksum” was produced.
One should be particularly wary of the aliasing that can occur when
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multiplying by a multiple of b. For example, for modulo-3 arithmetic, if
any erroneous integer value is multiplied by 6, then the result will be 0 in
modulo-3 space (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Thus, in our application of modulo-3
arithmetic, we pay special attention to multiplication operations (see Section
7.1.2).
2.2.3 Modular Base
To use modulo-b arithmetic to detect errors effectively in binary logic, we
choose b such that z′ = z mod b is a function of all of the bits in z. For
example, b = 4 would fail this test because now z′ is just the last two bits
of z, ignoring the higher-order bits (and any errors in those bits). We also
want each bit in z to have the ability to affect any bit in z′ to reduce the
probability of aliasing. For example, b = 6 would fail this test because the
last bit of z′ would only be affected by the last bit of z. The choice of b will
pass both of these tests if b is odd and b ≥ 3. In Chapters 7 and 9, we choose
b = 3 to minimize the hardware cost, as only two bits are needed to represent
the three possible modulo-3 values.
2.2.4 Mersenne Numbers
For positive integers n we define the Mersenne numbers by M(n) = 2n − 1.
The use of M(n) as a modulo base has the following useful property for n ≥ 2:
2n = 1 (mod M(n)) (2.6)
2.2.5 Binary Representations
Our encodings for modulo residues are based on the standard binary repre-
sentation for integers, where bits have weights with successive powers of two.
In other words the integer value of a particular sequence {bn−1, bn−2, ..., b0}
of bits is defined as:
v =
n−1∑
i=0
2ibi (2.7)
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A standard Mersenne number residue r with base M(n) will be in the range
0 ≤ r ≤ M(n)− 1 = 2n − 2. Thus n bits are sufficient to encode a residue
with base M(n), and the most significant bit (MSB), bn−1, will have weight
2n−1. If a carry bit is generated from adding two MSB bits, it will have weight
2n which is equivalent to 1 by application of Equation (2.6).
2.2.6 Normalization
There is one special encoding possible for an M(n) residue encoded with n
bits, the value where all bits bi = 1. This encoding has the integer value
2n − 1 = M(n) by Equation (2.7). Since this residue is the same as the
modulo base, it is equivalent to zero. We call this special encoding for zero
the denormalized encoding of zero, write it as −0, and call encodings that
allow it non-normalized encodings.
2.3 High-Level Synthesis
High-level synthesis, also known as behavioral synthesis, is a process that
turns a software behavioral specification with an architectural description
into hardware that implements that specification. The input to a high-level
synthesis tool is typically a C language dialect with language extensions (e.g.
pragmas and directives) and libraries to annotate the behavioral description
with architectural specifications. The output is a hardware description,
typically specified in Verilog or VHDL. A typical synthesis engine will perform
the following steps:
1. Compilation: The synthesis engine parses the input code and converts
it to an intermediate representation (IR).
2. Transformation and Optimization: The synthesis engine runs the
IR through a series of optimization passes, similar to software compiler
optimizations. The engine also does architectural transformations such
as loop unrolling and pipelining.
3. Allocation: For each hardware resource—memories, ports, registers,
and functional units—the synthesis engine determines what kind and
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how many of each to use. Larger allocations usually increase performance
at the cost of area.
4. Scheduling: The engine creates a state machine corresponding to the
control flow of the software specification. For each state, the engine
determines what operations—computations, memory access, and/or
I/Os—will occur in that state. The engine may insert extra states to
provide sufficient cycles to complete complex chains of operations.
5. Binding: For each operation, the engine determines which hardware
resource(s) will be involved in performing the operation. Operations
that can never occur at the same time can share a common hardware
resource. The engine inserts multiplexers at this stage to facilitate such
sharing.
6. RTL Generation: The engine generates a complete RTL description
of the final state machine and datapath solution.
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORK
3.1 Hybrid Quick Error Detection
The inspiration for H-QED is QED [6–9], which is a software technique for the
validation of programmable microprocessors. In general, validation techniques
that target processors (e.g., [10,11] and others) are inadequate for bugs inside
accelerators.
Given a high-level specification and a design produced by HLS (referred to
as an implementation), there is a large class of techniques that check if the
implementation is equivalent to the high-level specification, often relying on
formal techniques [12–14]. The goal is to detect bugs in the implementation
that are caused by the HLS tool. However, formal equivalence checking
techniques are limited in their capacity to handle HLS transformations and
this limitation is further compounded by the large state space of HLS imple-
mentations. In contrast, H-QED is a dynamic technique that integrates into
the HLS engine to follow instructions through HLS transformations and to
generate the corresponding software reference implementation. H-QED can
be run in pre-silicon simulation at RTL simulation speeds (with acceptable
overhead) or during post-silicon validation at full hardware speed.
3.1.1 Hybrid Tracing
Prior works such as [15, 16] perform source-level transformations to create
external ports for selected signals to improve observability. However, this
approach requires manual source code instrumentation. Furthermore, source
instrumentation interferes with compiler optimizations, creating intrusiveness.
A hardware-software runtime trace comparison technique is proposed in [17,18]
to provide automated HW/SW discrepancy detection. Both techniques use a
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mapping between software variables and hardware components through LLVM
variables to detect discrepancies and assist debug. Again, these techniques are
intrusive as they insert additional error detection operations that change the
schedule of the hardware design. In contrast, hybrid tracing instrumentation
is integrated into HLS to eliminate intrusiveness, creating an RTL design
with nonintrusive debugging annotations that can easily be removed before
synthesis.
3.1.2 Hybrid Hashing
Although hybrid hashing may appear to be similar to tracing techniques
used in PSV (e.g., using trace buffers or system memory [19–22]), there are
important differences:
1. Hybrid hashing systematically collects signatures, unlike tracing tech-
niques that are often ad-hoc or based on heuristics.
2. Hybrid hashing does not require extensive low-level (e.g., RTL) simula-
tion.
3. Hybrid hashing does not require designer-crafted assertions.
4. Hybrid hashing enables very short error detection latencies and high bug
coverage, unlike tracing techniques that become ineffective for difficult
bugs with long error detection latencies.
Hybrid hashing is distinct from fault-tolerant computing techniques for
processors (e.g., using watchdog processors, DIVA, multi-threading and sig-
nature techniques for duplex systems [23–28]). Many of these techniques only
check the register values as defined by the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA).
In contrast, hybrid hashing is effective for arbitrary hardware accelerators
created using HLS and automatically identifies signals to check in the resulting
designs. Unlike time redundancy and cycle stealing techniques for enhancing
reliability of designs created using HLS [29–31], hybrid hashing utilizes unique
aspects of the PSV environment (where the generation of software signatures
after a PSV run is acceptable vs. reliability techniques that focus on quick
error recovery) to minimize area/performance costs and intrusiveness.
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3.2 Modulo Shadow Datapaths
3.2.1 Low-Level Fault Resilience
There are many existing approaches to fault resilience. The classical approach
is modular redundancy [32,33], duplicating the entire hardware module and
comparing the outputs for discrepancies. Such an approach has 2× – 3× area
cost, which is prohibitively expensive and negates the benefits of Moore’s law
scaling.
Razor logic [34,35], an approach involving creating a shadow latch for each
flip-flop in a design, has been proposed to address timing errors, but also
imposes timing constraints on a design. Flip-flop hardening techniques [36,37]
have been proposed to address soft errors in flip-flops, but such techniques
do not protect combinational logic. Logic parity [38] is another technique
for protecting flip-flops by adding a parity flip-flop for flip-flop clusters with
parity prediction and checking logic. Such parity techniques are practically
limited to protecting only the flip-flops in a design using the aforementioned
clustering technique [38] due to the high overheads (e.g., around 30% area
overhead for a 32-bit adder [39]) associated with parity prediction across
functional units.
While razor logic, flip-flop hardening, and parity are limited to certain kinds
of faults and certain parts of a datapath, modulo shadow datapaths have
none of these limitations. Modulo shadow datapaths holistically protect the
entire datapath from input to output, including all of the combinational logic.
Modulo shadow datapaths is a general purpose error detection technique with
essentially no assumptions about fault behavior.
3.2.2 High-Level Error Resilience
There are also a number of high-level error resilience techniques, which are
related to (or may be leveraged in) our high-level synthesis approaches in
Chapters 7 and 9. DIVA [23] is a popular technique which uses an extra
checker core to verify the correctness of a main core computation and commit
only non-faulty results. Concurrent error detection (CED) [40] uses HLS to
introduce redundancy at the functional unit level. Although each component
is fully duplicated, this technique aims at reducing area and performance
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overhead through resource sharing. But this technique can incur at least 75%
area cost for simple and small datapaths.
Another approach is time-redundancy, where we re-compute results using
the same hardware units to detect errors. In [41], Wu and Karri use a time
redundancy-based concurrent error detection scheme with diverse binding
solutions in its re-computation stage but has performance overheads even
though it incurs low area cost. Argus [42] is a prototype processor with
a modulo-3 arithmetic checker that can detect up to 98.0% and 98.8% of
unmasked transient and permanent errors respectively. Argus has low area
(17%) and performance (4%) costs but it is limited to the Von Neumann
processor architecture and, to the best of our knowledge, there is no similar
work in high-level synthesis that targets application-specific custom logic and
accelerator designs.
In [43], Karri et al. integrated modular redundancy into high-level synthesis
and presented techniques to increase reliability with cost and performance
constraints and decrease cost given reliability constraints, but not both
together. New approaches to modular redundancy such as statistical error
compensation (SEC) involving pairing an estimator module with unreliable
hardware still come with high (50-100%) area cost [44]. Tosun et al. [45]
proposed a technique to recover from soft errors but do not perform any error
injection experiments and has a passive approach to masking errors whereas
we actively detect and correct errors.
Finally, Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) [46, 47] is an algorithm-
level technique for protecting linear vector and matrix computations by
predicting and checking the sums of groups of output elements. ABFT
can involve expensive extra memory accesses for checksum computation and
storage and may require the duplication of vectors for certain computations. In
Chapter 9, we empirically show that these costs make cost-effective application
of ABFT to reliable accelerator designs difficult.
3.2.3 Modulo Arithmetic Functional Units
For small modulo bases, a lookup table based approach has been used for
basic functional units [48] with explicit don’t cares inserted to provide hints
to the logic synthesis engine for inputs combinations that should never occur.
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A reducer is built with a tree of such lookup-table based modulo adders [48].
Such an approach is impractical for larger bases due to exponential scaling.
Piestrak et al. propose a design for a modulo-3 reducer consisting of full-
adder (FA) cells and interleaved inverters [48, 49] which exploits the fact
that for a given bit b ∈ {0, 1}, 2b = −b = 3 − b = 2 + (1 − b) (mod 3). In
other words, bits of weight 2 can be inverted and treated as a bit of weight
1 with a constant offset (which can be lumped together at the end) so that
all bits have the same weight of 1 and can be passed through stages of FAs.
While this design may appear superficially similar to our reducer design in
Figure 8.1b on page 83, our design uses a more general strategy inspired
by Wallace trees that does not require separate inverters. Furthermore our
strategy generalizes to any Mersenne base while their design trick is limited
to modulo-3 arithmetic.
For cryptography applications, there are also a number of hardware accel-
erator designs for accelerating modulo exponentiation of large (e.g. 256-bit)
numbers which is performed with a series of modulo multiplies [50]. These de-
signs use application-specific algorithms (e.g. Montgomery multiplication [51])
that make them very specialized for big-integer modulo exponentiation, and
thus unsuitable for reliability applications.
3.3 Cross-Layer Reliability
The CLEAR study [38] was a cross-layer approach to finding the most cost-
effective way to improve flip-flop soft error reliability in programmable mi-
croprocessors, considering both software and hardware transformations and
their combinations to improve reliability. But, with Dennard scaling ending,
the status quo of using programmable microprocessors for all computation is
disrupted by hardware accelerators that proliferate on SoCs and embedded
FPGAs due to their performance and energy benefits. Thus, a complete relia-
bility solution for modern complex SoCs must consider both microprocessors
and accelerators.
In Chapter 9, we take a cross-layer approach to the reliability problem for
application specific hardware accelerators. While existing coding techniques
address soft errors in memories and CLEAR [38] addressed soft errors in
microprocessor flip-flops; cost-effective error resilience for flip-flops in hardware
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accelerators remains a challenging problem.
Compared to the microprocessor reliability problem, the hardware acceler-
ator reliability problem poses some unique opportunities and challenges. As
shown in [38], when limiting processor cores to running specific applications,
combinations incorporating algorithm-level techniques like algorithm-based
fault tolerance (ABFT) correction can further reduce energy overheads. In
general-purpose processor cores, imposing such limitations are not always
possible; however, the application-specific nature of accelerators allows us to
fully explore these opportunities.
Additionally, in application-specific hardware accelerators, most of the
software parts of the stack are removed since the algorithm is hard-wired
into the hardware logic. Thus, algorithm and instruction overhead (which
manifested as execution time overhead on microprocessors) is translated into
hardware overhead. On the other hand, this translation into hardware results
allows for optimizations of the software techniques at the hardware level by
leveraging hardware customization not previously possible in general-purpose
processors. Finally, given the interest of implementing application-specific
accelerators not only on custom application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs)
but also in an agile manner by utilizing reconfigurable field-programmable gate
arrays (FPGAs), it is necessary to explore and understand the implications
for reliability when changing the underlying hardware assumptions.
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CHAPTER 4
HYBRID QUICK ERROR DETECTION
In this chapter, we introduce the basic concepts for the Hybrid Quick Error De-
tection (H-QED) technique to overcome validation and debugging challenges
for non-programmable hardware accelerators on SoCs. Such accelerators
implement a pre-defined set of functions and are not programmable using
software (unlike processor cores or software-programmable accelerators such as
GPUs). H-QED is inspired by the QED technique for PSV [6–9]. Since QED is
(mostly) implemented in software, the error detection latencies of bugs inside
hardware accelerators can be very long (e.g., bounded by long execution times
of hardware accelerators). H-QED builds on advances in high-level synthesis
(HLS) [52,53] to overcome this challenge by automatically embedding small
hardware structures inside hardware accelerators. H-QED simultaneously
improves error detection latencies and coverage of logic and electrical bugs
inside hardware accelerators. H-QED is compatible with QED. By combin-
ing H-QED with QED, we provide a systematic solution for PSV of SoCs
consisting of processor cores, uncore components, software-programmable
accelerators, and hardware accelerators. H-QED can be applied to both
pre-silicon and post-silicon validation and debugging scenarios and provides
effective source-code bug localization.
4.1 Basic Principles
The basic principles of H-QED are illustrated in Figure 4.1, which involves
three key components:
 fine-grained debugging instrumentation
 simulation/execution with two diverse toolchains
 comparison of the instrument outputs
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Figure 4.1: Basic working principles of H-QED. A toolchain can be any
process that executes or simulates the design. IR = Intermediate
Representation.
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The instrument pass adds debugging logic or instructions that cause the
design to generate output which is a function of the design’s internal state.
This instrumentation can be translated to unsynthesizable code for pre-
silicon validation or signature generation logic for post-silicon validation. The
two toolchains are abstract processes that perform transformations on the
design leading to some execution or simulation that produces the runtime
output of the instruments. When a design contains a non-deterministic
bug, it is unlikely that two diverse toolchains will generate models and/or
physical designs with identical external and internal behavior. Fine-grained
instruments will capture this behavioral discrepancy resulting in two different
instrument outputs and the bug will be caught. Because the instruments
are fine-grained, the error detection latency will be low and many masked
bugs will also be caught. Thus H-QED should quickly detect any bug in the
source code that results in non-deterministic behavior. It is also clear from
Figure 4.1 that H-QED can detect toolchain bugs as a bug in one toolchain
that affects the instrument outputs in that branch will result in a mismatch
with the outputs produced by the other toolchain. When one “toolchain”
involves a full IC fabrication and testing process, this capability of H-QED is
particularly important for detecting electrical bugs.
While different variations of this process are possible (in particular inte-
grating the instrumentation pass into parts of the two toolchains is beneficial
as we will see), the key invariant is that the instruments must produce the
same output in both toolchains if the design is free of bugs. In order to
achieve this, the instruments must generate output that is a function of
deterministic variables, e.g. output cannot depend on signals in unknown
states. Furthermore, the order of the instrument output must be preserved in
both toolchains. Finally, an important constraint from a practical point of
view is to insert instruments so as to avoid intrusiveness, meaning that the
external and internal behavior of a design should not change when instru-
ments are added. Instruments that change the behavior of a design can also
change the behavior of bugs in that design, undermining its bug detection
and localization benefit.
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4.2 Hybrid Tracing vs. Hybrid Hashing
Since pre-silicon validation and post-silicon validation have different con-
straints for inserting instruments into a design, we created different variations
of H-QED for each scenario. In this thesis, we present both adaptations
of H-QED: a pre-silicon tailored adaptation called hybrid tracing which we
discuss in Chapter 5 and a post-silicon tailored adaptation called hybrid
hashing which we discuss in Chapter 6. We now provide a brief comparative
overview of each adaptation.
4.2.1 Hybrid Tracing
In pre-silicon validation, simulation time is the primary challenge. As men-
tioned before, simulation speeds are many orders of magnitude slower than
real-time, limiting testing coverage. To address this problem, hybrid tracing
leverages HLS to select RTL signals for only CDFG variables, minimizing over-
head. Hybrid tracing also leverages co-simulation to use high-level language
simulation for parts of the design not being directly tested. As mentioned
before, high-level language simulation is 1000× faster than RTL simula-
tion. Compared to hybrid hashing, hybrid tracing has the following unique
advantages:
1. Hybrid tracing instrument output produces full variable values with
unsynthesizable constructs, making the design state fully visible.
2. Hybrid tracing leverages this information to pinpoint the source code
location for bug activation.
3. Hybrid tracing instruments are easily removed or ignored from the
generated RTL when the design passes validation and is ready for
synthesis.
4.2.2 Hybrid Hashing
In post-silicon validation, minimizing area and instrument output bandwidth
costs are the primary challenges. To meet bandwidth constraints, hybrid
hashing probes internal CDFG variable values and reduces those values with
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a running hash function, reducing output bandwidth to a single bit for each
multi-cycle interval. The hash function logic has significant area cost, so it
is shared as much as possible with multiplexers by scheduling probes for a
“non-temporary” variable subset (variables with long lifetimes and thus also
scheduling flexibility). Compared to hybrid tracing, hybrid hashing has the
following unique advantages:
1. Hybrid hashing instruments are designed to be synthesized as lightweight
hardware integrated into an accelerator, enabling bugs to be caught
(electrical bugs in particular) that could not be caught in pre-silicon
validation due to model limits.
2. Hybrid hashing has essentially no performance impact and allows a
manufactured IC to run at full speed.
4.3 Effectiveness and Practicality
As a preview for our experimental results when applying H-QED, we observe
the following, demonstrating the effectiveness and practicality of the technique:
1. H-QED enables 2–3 orders of magnitude improvement in error detection
latencies for both electrical bugs and logic bugs vs. validation techniques
using end-result-checks that compare accelerator outputs against known
correct outputs.
2. H-QED uncovered two previously unknown logic bugs in the widely
used CHStone HLS benchmark suite [54].
3. H-QED does not require any failure reproduction or low-level simulation
(e.g., RTL or netlist) to detect bugs.
4. H-QED allows accelerators to operate in “native” mode (similar to
normal system operation) and has a minimal intrusiveness impact.
(Incorporation of H-QED continues to detect bugs that are detected by
traditional validation techniques.)
5. Hybrid tracing detects all non-deterministic logic bugs in CHStone
within one cycle.
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6. Hybrid tracing pinpoints where in the source code the bug activates
and provides a strong hint for possible bug fixes.
7. Hybrid hashing improves electrical bug (timing error) coverage by up
to 3× compared to PSV techniques using end-result-checks.
8. Hybrid hashing incurs an 8% accelerator area overhead and negligible
performance costs.
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss our pre-silicon and post-silicon H-QED imple-
mentations in detail. Chapter 5 discusses the hybrid tracing technique and
Chapter 6 discusses the hybrid hashing technique.
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CHAPTER 5
PRE-SILICON DEBUG: HYBRID TRACING
We call our pre-silicon variation of H-QED hybrid tracing since we use
uncompressed traces of variable values for the instrument outputs in Figure 4.1
on page 26. Hybrid tracing can be used for both module-level pre-silicon
verification of HLS-produced RTL as well as pre-silicon integration testing —
verification of multiple RTL modules and software on a CPU into a system.
Although module-level testing is important, integration testing invariably
detects additional bugs that went undetected due to insufficient module-level
test vectors or bugs that relate to integration (e.g. a module that works
perfectly with the expected number of input data items, but another module
sends the wrong amount of data). In both cases, the goal of hybrid tracing is
to detect logic bugs as RTL-level simulation models only logic, not electrical
behavior.
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, hybrid tracing enables hardware designers to
isolate logic bugs by swapping between C/C++ reference implementations
and RTL implementations with HLS. Thus, designers can validate complex
designs piecemeal, selecting one module at a time to integrate with the rest
of the system for verification. Note that the designer of a target module only
needs high-level C/C++ models of the system it interfaces with, which need
not be synthesizable, enabling early stage integration testing for parts that are
synthesizable. Our framework compares the series of module output values
for discrepancies between the software model and the RTL implementation.
When validation reveals a problem due to non-deterministic behavior, our
code instrumentation, trace comparison and back-tracing steps (discussed in
Section 5.2) provide the hardware designer with C/C++ locations where the
discrepancies occur.
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Figure 5.1: Using hybrid tracing for early pre-silicon integration testing.
Table 5.1: Methods for Catching Different Kinds of Logic Bugs
unactivated masked unmasked
deterministic coverage
analysis
unit testing debug tools
non-deterministic hybrid tracing
5.1 Comparison to Software Debugging
As mentioned in Chapter 1, logic bugs have many ways to elude detection.
Fortunately, hybrid tracing leverages HLS, which brings in a variety of software
debugging tools to bear on the problem. Table 5.1 broadly classifies logic bugs
by their behavior in three categories: unactivated, masked, and unmasked.
Each of these bug classes can be further divided into deterministic and
non-deterministic subcategories.
Unactivated bugs are caused by gaps in coverage (e.g. the buggy line
of code was never executed or a condition was never met) which are best
addressed by software coverage analysis tools. Such tools will point out these
gaps, allowing the hardware designer to modify the design or test vectors to
eliminate the coverage gaps and activate bugs that may be hiding in those gaps.
A deterministic, activated bug is reliably reproducible by definition. Existing
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software debugging tools are good at helping a user to isolate a deterministic
bug. While software debugging tools can help with deterministic, masked
bugs as well by increasing observability, software practices also encourage
unit testing to help detect such masked bugs in the first place.
Software debugging techniques are much less useful for non-deterministic,
activated bugs. By definition, such bugs are likely to behave differently
in a software testing environment when compared to an RTL simulation
environment. For example, the bug may cause a failure in RTL simulation,
but the high-level simulation produces correct output, rendering software
debugging techniques by themselves unhelpful. Without any aid to track this
bug down, the hardware designer has little choice but to attempt to find the
bug in the RTL waveform by tracing backward in execution from the observed
failure to the root cause. After this painstaking process, the designer has
another difficult problem to solve: determining the source-code level meaning
for the buggy RTL variable he identified. This can be very non-trivial with the
complex software and HLS transformations involved in translating a high-level
language to RTL. Hybrid tracing is designed to address both of these difficult
problems, making isolation for the most difficult bugs automated and fast.
5.2 Hybrid Tracing Framework
Our hybrid tracing implementation is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The input to
the framework is a C++ module targeted for debugging and written with a
synthesizable subset of C++ supported by the HLS tool. Additional non-
synthesizable modules (not shown to simplify the illustration) representing
the system environment such as those in Figure 5.1 can be integrated into the
hardware simulation through co-simulation and into the software simulation
environment through linking.
As one would expect from an H-QED variant, there are two branches of
the framework, a hardware RTL-level simulation branch and a “reference”
software branch. Both branches have integrated instrumentation passes
to enable greater observability of internal source-level variables. In the
hardware branch, the instrumentation is integrated into the HLS engine after
scheduling to minimize intrusiveness. The HLS engine produces SystemVerilog
as output, which is then translated to a cycle-accurate SystemC module
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Figure 5.2: Our hybrid tracing framework.
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using Verilator [55,56]. The software branch performs software compilation
using the LLVM framework [57] and contains a custom instrumentation
pass designed to reproduce the trace output produced by the hardware
simulation given some scheduling and address mapping information from the
HLS instrumentation pass. The output of the two branches is variable trace
sequences for discrepancy analysis; when mismatches are found, information
on which variable(s) caused the discrepancy can be used to identify the
C/C++ source code involved with the bug. We now discuss each component
of our framework in detail in the following subsections.
5.2.1 Hardware Simulation
The hardware simulation is a cycle-accurate RTL simulation of the hardware
module in a test environment that can include high-level implementations of
modules it interfaces with. This process starts with the high-level synthesis of
the LLVM Intermediate Representation (LLVM-IR) for the hardware module.
We use an in-house high-level synthesis engine that is based on LegUp [58]. We
insert our hardware instrumentation pass after scheduling and optimization,
but before binding. The pass takes an optimized, scheduled CDFG as input
and adds trace annotations on all variables that have a software counterpart.
In our previous prototype implementation in [3], the instrumentation pass
was inserted pre-scheduling. The problem with this approach is that the trace
calls need to be scheduled and their dependencies considered. This results
in some cases in deferred scheduling of trace calls to maintain ordering (i.e.
the scheduler would prefer to reorder the trace calls to match the scheduling
of the operations traced, but is not allowed to) which can increase register
pressure artificially, change the synthesis result, and result in multicycle
error detection latencies. Furthermore, trace calls create false dependencies
that can potentially block or complicate HLS optimizations. To improve the
hybrid tracing implementation in [3], we split the instrumentation pass into
complementary hardware and software passes as shown in Figure 5.2 and
integrated the hardware instrumentation pass into our HLS engine.
Adding the trace calls pre-binding makes them mere debugging annotations
on signals that the HLS engine has decided are “real” signals (i.e. not
redundant operations or dead operations) that must be bound to a physical
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Listing 5.1: Input C++ Code (foo.cpp)
1 int bar [ 4 ] ;
2 int f oo ( int x , int index ) {
3 int y = bar [ index ] ;
4 bar [ index ] = x + y ;
5 return x * y ;
6 }
Listing 5.2: LLVM-IR (Simplified for Clarity)
g l o b a l [ 4 x i32 ] bar
i 32 foo ( i 32 x , i 32 index ) {
i 32 * addr = gete l ementptr ( bar [ index ] )
i 32 y = load addr
i32 tmp1 = add x , y
s t o r e tmp1 → addr
i32 tmp2 = mul x , y
r e t tmp2
}
resource. The trace annotations simply follow their operations and variables to
the physical functional units and registers that they are bound to, producing
the appropriate output in the state the variable is generated. During binding,
the annotations are handled separately from the binding of “real” hardware.
In other words, the addition of these debugging annotations is nonintrusive
as they do not affect the synthesizable binding solution generated by the HLS
engine. Furthermore, the annotations can easily be removed or ignored for
the purpose of synthesis.
We illustrate our hardware instrumentation pass with an example shown
Listing 5.3: Scheduled Operations (Custom IR)
<0x1000> g l o b a l [ 4 x i32 ] bar
i 32 foo ( i 32 x , i 32 index ) {
[ 0 ] i 32 addr = add index , 0x1000
[0−1] i 32 y = load addr
[ 1 ] i 32 tmp1 = add x , y
[1−2] s t o r e tmp1 → addr
[1−2] i 32 tmp2 = mul x , y
[ 2 ] r e t tmp2
}
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Listing 5.4: Hardware Trace Operations Inserted
i 32 foo ( i 32 x , i 32 index ) {
. . .
[ 0 ] t r a c e (0 , x )
[ 0 ] t r a c e (1 , index )
[ 0 ] t r a c e (2 , addr )
[ 1 ] t r a c e (3 , y )
[ 1 ] t r a c e (4 , tmp1)
[ 2 ] t r a c e (5 , tmp2)
[ 2 ] r e t tmp2
}
Listing 5.5: Software Trace Operations Inserted
i 32 foo ( i 32 x , i 32 index ) {
. . .
t r a c e (0 , x )
t r a c e (1 , index )
t r a c e (2 , addr convert ( addr ) )
t r a c e (3 , y )
t r a c e (4 , tmp1)
t r a c e (5 , tmp2)
r e t tmp2
}
Table 5.2: Hardware Address Map
Memory Address Depth Width
bar 0x1000 4 32
Table 5.3: Trace Schedule
Func. Block Traced Variables
foo entry x:0, index:1, addr:2,
y:3, tmp1:4, tmp2:5
Table 5.4: Debugging Information
id func:var file:line:col
0 foo:x foo.cpp:2:14
1 foo:index foo.cpp:2:21
2 foo:addr foo.cpp:3:16
3 foo:y foo.cpp:3:9
4 foo:tmp1 foo.cpp:4:20
5 foo:tmp2 foo.cpp:5:14
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Table 5.5: Address Translation Table
Variable SW addr HW addr
bar[0] 0xa7010 0x1000
bar[1] 0xa7014 0x1001
bar[2] 0xa7018 0x1002
bar[3] 0xa701c 0x1003
in Listings 5.1–5.5 and Tables 5.2–5.5. Listing 5.1 shows an example input C
program with a global variable to be mapped to a memory and a function
which becomes a hardware module. Listing 5.2 shows the same program
lowered to LLVM-IR and Listing 5.3 shows the scheduled, optimized hardware
IR (internal scheduled CDFG and memory address space map representation)
right before binding. The memory is annotated with its base address on the
left, and each instruction is annotated on the left with scheduling informa-
tion indicating the cycles the instruction is scheduled for execution in. An
instruction result becomes available on the final cycle it executes.
Listing 5.4 shows the additional trace instructions inserted by our hardware
instrumentation pass as well as their scheduled states. Table 5.2 shows the
hardware address map determined by our HLS engine and passed to the
software instrumentation pass (Section 5.2.2). Each row of the address map
indicates an LLVM variable, its base hardware address and the corresponding
memory block depth and width. Table 5.3 is the trace schedule passed from
our hardware instrumentation pass to the software instrumentation pass. The
trace schedule has a row for each basic block in each function and indicates
the LLVM-IR variables traced in that basic block, in the order they are traced,
as well as a unique integer identifier for each variable.
The challenge in creating this trace schedule is mapping hardware IR vari-
ables to LLVM-IR variables. Not all LLVM-IR variables have a corresponding
hardware IR counterpart as some CDFG nodes may be optimized away by
HLS transformations (e.g. a global array reference becomes a constant address
in hardware IR after the HLS engine defines a static address space mapping
which can lead to further constant propagation optimizations). Similarly
not all hardware IR variables have an LLVM-IR counterpart. An abstract
LLVM-IR operation such as the memory address computing getelementptr
operation can involve a number of additions and multiplications, generating
multiple hardware IR variables that represent intermediate computations and
38
do not correspond to the final getelementptr result.
Our solution to this problem is to propagate debugging annotations in our
hardware IR. During the initial lowering of LLVM-IR to our hardware IR,
we annotate hardware IR CDFG nodes with references to the corresponding
LLVM-IR variables they are equivalent to. We then preserve these LLVM-
IR variable references across hardware IR transforms such as scheduling
and optimization where feasible. Even if a variable is lowered to a con-
stant, we propagate the variable annotation to a constant as this enables the
compile-time computation of the constant value to be checked. Our hardware
instrumentation pass can then scan the hardware IR to find all nodes with
debugging annotations, generate trace instructions for them, and use the
annotations to produce the corresponding LLVM-IR instruction in the trace
schedule.
Once the trace annotations are inserted, our HLS engine performs binding
and finishes with RTL generation, during which our HLS engine lowers each
“trace” instruction instance to a SystemVerilog “$fwrite” call that prints the
corresponding variable ID and value to a file.1 The hardware simulation
process then proceeds with the following steps:
Verilator Send the resulting SystemVerilog RTL code through Verilator [55,
56]. Verilator translates the RTL code to an equivalent cycle-accurate SystemC
representation that a standard C++ compiler can compile and run against
the SystemC libraries.2
Clang+LLVM Using the Clang and LLVM compiler toolchain, compile
the cycle-accurate SystemC version of the hardware module. The hardware
module can optionally be linked with untimed high-level C/C++ versions of
software modules it interfaces with some additional glue code to connect the
SystemC interfaces to the untimed C/C++ function calls.
CPU Execution Run the resulting machine code on a CPU. The binary
will use the CPU for untimed execution of software portions of the design,
and will perform cycle-accurate RTL simulation of the hardware module. The
1These calls can easily be ignored or removed for the purpose of synthesis after debugging
is complete.
2An alternative to SystemC translation is RTL/C++ co-simulation. We find that
SystemC RTL simulation is faster [3].
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instrumented hardware module will dump RTL execution traces to a file to
be sent to the comparison step (Section 5.2.3) together with the software-only
reference trace.
5.2.2 Reference Simulation
The purpose of the reference simulation is to produce a “gold” reference
trace that the hardware simulation should reproduce exactly under bug-free
conditions. This process starts with the LLVM-IR software instrumentation
pass that inserts instrumentation that generates this trace. In order for the
software instrumentation pass to generate code that matches the hardware
trace, it needs two pieces of information from the hardware instrumentation
pass (Section 5.2.1): a trace schedule and a hardware address map.
The trace schedule provides the ordering of the trace calls as determined
by the decisions made by the HLS scheduler, enabling the software pass to
generate code that produces the trace output in the same order. The hardware
address map enables the software pass to generate code that reproduces hard-
ware address values by translating software addresses to hardware addresses.
The hardware instrumentation pass also generates a debugging information
table that provides a source location for each LLVM-IR variable that is traced,
which enables the backtracing process (Section 5.2.3) to provide source-level
meaning to the hardware designer. This debugging information is generated
from debugging metadata provided by the LLVM compiler infrastructure.
We continue our example to illustrate this process. Listing 5.5 shows the
software trace operations the software instrumentation pass adds to the LLVM-
IR in Listing 5.2 and Table 5.4 shows the outputted debugging information
file. The pass adds calls to two library functions that we implement and link
the LLVM module against: “trace” and “addr convert”. The trace function
is semantically equivalent to the hardware variant, taking a variable ID and
value and writing that variable ID and value pair to a file with an “fprintf”
call. The addr convert call is inserted for all address variables traced and
takes a software address as input, translates it to a hardware address, and
outputs that hardware address. This translation process is based on a static
address translation table generated at runtime, which we will discuss shortly.
We then run the instrumented LLVM-IR through the LLVM backend to
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generate machine code that runs on the host CPU, linking the code with
our library that implements the “trace” and “addr convert” functions. Since
the trace function generates output, the software compiler cannot change the
relative ordering of the trace calls, ensuring that the software trace order will
match the hardware trace order under bug-free conditions.
The resulting machine code is then run on the CPU, which executes the
software model of the module and generates a trace through the inserted
“trace” calls. To enable the “addr convert” calls, we first generate a translation
table for all variable elements mapped to hardware memory blocks at the start
of execution using the hardware address map as well as dynamic software
addresses of variable elements in that address map. Table 5.5 shows the
address translation table for our example, generated with the help of the
hardware address map (Table 5.2). The software addresses for these variables
are fixed at runtime and thus can be computed at runtime initialization
because we ensure that such variables are mapped to static memory. Once
the table is initialized, each software to hardware address conversion is a
simple lookup in this table.3
5.2.3 Trace Comparison and Debugging
Once the reference simulation (Section 5.2.2) and hardware simulation (Sec-
tion 5.2.1) are complete, we compare the resulting trace files for both simula-
tions. Under bug-free conditions, the traces will be identical since we ensure
that the ordering of the trace calls produced by the reference simulation
matches the hardware schedule and we perform software to hardware address
translation to produce hardware address values in the reference simulation.
Thus any discrepancy indicates a bug. (See Section 5.4 for an example bug
and how our process detects it.) For discrepancies observed, we look up
the variable IDs with mismatched values in the debug info file generated by
the software instrumentation pass (Section 5.2.2, Table 5.4) to identify the
variable name and source locations for the mismatched variables. For the first
variable ID with a discrepancy, we report the variable name, source location,
and the pair of mismatched values observed to the hardware designer.
3To translate legitimate pointers to the “end” of an array (i.e. one past the last element,
used as an upper pointer bound in a loop), we first pass the LLVM-IR module through a
transformation that adds an extra dummy element to each array.
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Table 5.6: Bug Detection Example
Source Code Reference Trace Hardware Trace
int x ;
i f ( cond ) {
x = 1 ;
}
z = x + y ;
cond : 0
−− sk ip body −−
x : 7461
y : 7
x + y : 7468
cond : 0
−− sk ip body −−
x : −24905
y : 7
x + y : −24898
5.3 Simulation Breakpoint Trigger
A variation of hybrid tracing can be used as a hardware simulation breakpoint
trigger. This can be useful if a bug is only activated in the generated hardware.
In this variation, the reference simulation trace must be generated first. In
the hardware simulation, the trace function is then implemented as a function
that reads one variable ID and value pair from the reference simulation trace
and checks if it matches the variable ID and value parameters the function
receives. If there is a mismatch, the function calls the Verilog “$stop” function
(or similar) to suspend the simulation, put it in interactive mode, and enable
the test engineer to examine the simulated hardware state right at the point
the bug first activates.
5.4 Bug Example
How does hybrid tracing detect bugs? We have found that a reader’s intuition
often leads one to the conclusion that source code bugs cannot be caught
because the same buggy code is fed to both the hardware and software
simulations, and thus the two simulations will produce identical traces. While
this intuition is correct for deterministic bugs that always behave the same
way, this intuition fails for non-deterministic bugs that have hard-to-predict
behavior that depends on many confounding factors. (The reader may want to
refer back to Section 1.3 for insights about different kinds of bug behavior and
to Section 5.1 for how hybrid tracing fits in with other debugging techniques.)
To drive this point home, we provide a simple example of a non-deterministic
source-code bug in Table 5.6. The bug in the source code is that “x” is used
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uninitialized, and thus its value is non-deterministic, i.e. it is toolchain and
environment dependent. The reference simulation will likely use some garbage
value from the stack, previously used for some other variable. The hardware
simulation could use the register initial power-on state. It is unlikely that the
hardware and software values for “x” are identical, and thus hybrid tracing
pinpoints the location where the bug activates.
Note that while this bug is a simple example for explanatory purposes,
initialization bugs can have much more complex activation conditions (e.g.
involving large buffers that are partially initialized). More importantly, there
are many other types of non-deterministic bugs that cause different hardware
and software behavior such as undefined memory accesses, timing dependent
bugs, and hardware-specific protocol violations. In our experiments with all
of the known bugs in the CHStone high-level synthesis benchmark suite [54]
in Section 5.5.3 we find that hybrid tracing is able to detect many different
kinds of logic bugs, including some previously unknown bugs as well as bugs
that a suite of existing static software analysis and dynamic software bug
detection techniques are unable to detect.
5.5 Experimental Results
To demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of hybrid tracing we ran a
series of simulation experiments to collect data for cycle, flip-flop, and simu-
lation overhead as well as error detection latencies and coverage estimates for
logic bugs. We used all 12 benchmarks from CHStone [54] and 15 benchmarks
from the PolyBench [54] benchmark suites.
5.5.1 Intrusiveness
To determine the intrusiveness of hybrid tracing, we performed HLS with and
without hybrid tracing and measured the number of flip-flops and benchmark
execution cycles for each benchmark. The hybrid tracing values normalized to
the baseline values are shown Table 5.7. For reference we also performed the
same experiment with the LLVM-level instrumentation insertion approach
of [3]. We observe significant overheads for that approach as high as a 247%
cycle overhead and a 2.5% flip-flop overhead.
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Table 5.7: Overhead Due to Intrusiveness (flip-flops / cycles, %)
Bench [3] HT
adpcm 24.91 / 0.00 0 / 0
aes 246.88 / 0.02 0 / 0
atax 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
bicg 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
blowfish 29.16 / 0.00 0 / 0
dfadd 11.05 / 2.51 0 / 0
dfdiv 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
dfmul 5.65 / 0.00 0 / 0
dfsin 7.55 / 1.47 0 / 0
doitgen 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
floyd-warsh 17.87 / 0.00 0 / 0
gemm 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
gemver 5.80 / 0.00 0 / 0
gesummv 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
Bench [3] HT
gsm 0.31 / 0.00 0 / 0
jpeg 25.63 / 0.00 0 / 0
matrix 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
matrix-tiled 28.20 / 0.00 0 / 0
mips 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
motion 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
mvt 26.48 / 0.00 0 / 0
reg-detect 22.96 / 0.08 0 / 0
sha 18.28 / 0.00 0 / 0
symm 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
syr2k 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
syrk 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
trmm 0.00 / 0.00 0 / 0
The LLVM-level instrumentation of [3] creates significant cycle overhead
because it imposes an additional constraint on the scheduler to maintain
trace call order. The flip-flop overhead is the result of variable lifetime
extensions needed for trace calls scheduled one or more cycles after what
would normally be the end of a variable’s lifetime. This delayed trace call
scheduling is the result of the aforementioned scheduling constraints and causes
increased register pressure, and thus may increase required register allocation.
Our hybrid tracing approach, in contrast, has no intrusiveness because the
instrumentation is inserted after scheduling, so the instrumentation cannot
interfere with the schedule by design. Furthermore, we show that QoR is
unaffected by instrumentation, and thus the instrumentation can be ignored
or removed for logic synthesis input equivalent to the same design without
instrumentation.
5.5.2 Simulation Time Costs
To determine the simulation performance impact of hybrid tracing, we mea-
sured the SystemC RTL simulation time of untraced RTL code for our 27
benchmarks and compared it with the combined time of software simulation
and SystemC RTL simulation with tracing enabled. The results are shown
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Benchmark C-sim + trace (s) RTL-sim (s) RTL-sim + trace (s) Both traces (s)
adpcm 0.103 0.347 0.402 0.505
aes 0.041 0.043 0.071 0.112
atax 0.044 0.032 0.062 0.106
bicg 0.031 0.029 0.052 0.083
blowfish 0.901 1.931 2.516 3.417
dfadd 0.012 0.012 0.017 0.029
dfdiv 0.006 0.011 0.016 0.022
dfmul 0.005 0.010 0.011 0.016
dfsin 0.124 0.303 0.427 0.551
doitgen 15.137 7.734 18.038 33.175
floyd-warshall 0.552 0.210 0.628 1.180
gemm 0.525 0.342 0.700 1.225
gemver 0.065 0.106 0.153 0.218
gesummv 0.035 0.023 0.047 0.082
gsm 0.029 0.047 0.061 0.090
jpeg 2.469 30.131 31.938 34.407
matrix4x4 0.030 0.022 0.040 0.070
matrix 0.123 0.031 0.109 0.232
mips 0.025 0.019 0.040 0.065
motion 0.020 0.039 0.050 0.070
mvt 0.046 0.040 0.073 0.119
reg-detect 2.411 5.037 6.380 8.791
sha 1.210 2.331 3.128 4.338
symm 0.332 0.191 0.409 0.741
syr2k 0.774 0.407 0.919 1.693
syrk 0.530 0.254 0.637 1.167
trmm 0.012 0.010 0.018 0.030
adpcm 0.297 1.000 1.159 1.455
aes 0.953 1.000 1.651 2.605
atax 1.375 1.000 1.938 3.313
bicg 1.069 1.000 1.793 2.862
blowfish 0.467 1.000 1.303 1.770
dfadd 1.000 1.000 1.417 2.417
dfdiv 0.545 1.000 1.455 2.000
dfmul 0.500 1.000 1.100 1.600
dfsin 0.409 1.000 1.409 1.818
doitgen 1.957 1.000 2.332 4.290
floyd-warshall 2.629 1.000 2.990 5.619
gemm 1.535 1.000 2.047 3.582
gemver 0.613 1.000 1.443 2.057
gesummv 1.522 1.000 2.043 3.565
gsm 0.617 1.000 1.298 1.915
jpeg 0.082 1.000 1.060 1.142
matrix4x4 1.364 1.000 1.818 3.182
matrix 3.968 1.000 3.516 7.484
mips 1.316 1.000 2.105 3.421
motion 0.513 1.000 1.282 1.795
mvt 1.150 1.000 1.825 2.975
reg-detect 0.479 1.000 1.267 1.745
sha 0.519 1.000 1.342 1.861
symm 1.738 1.000 2.141 3.880
syr2k 1.902 1.000 2.258 4.160
syrk 2.087 1.000 2.508 4.594
trmm 1.200 1.000 1.800 3.000
median 1.069 1.000 1.793 2.862
mean 1.178 1.000 1.789 2.967
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Figure 5.3: Hybrid tracing instrumented RTL simulation and C++
simulation time normalized to uninstrumented RTL simulation.
in Figure 5.3. We observe a mean RTL simulation time of 1.79× and an
additional reference simulation time of 1.18× compared to untraced RTL
simulation for a total mean overhead of 2.97×. Reduction of overheads may
be possible by engineering faster variations of the trace functions, in particular
by using binary mode I/O operations for writing and comparing traces (i.e.
to avoid formatting overhead for human readability of trace files).
5.5.3 Logic Bug Effectiveness
To evaluate the effectiveness of hybrid tracing in detecting logic bugs, we
considered all 21 known real bugs in the current and past versions of CH-
Stone [54], 7 synthetic bugs injected into CHStone benchmarks, 2 bugs in
previous versions of our HLS engine itself, and 3 bugs in a synthesizable C
implementation of a matrix multiply kernel generated by FCUDA [59]. We
attempted to detect these bugs with both hybrid tracing and hybrid hashing.
Hybrid hashing is designed primarily to detect electrical bugs, but we provide
logic bug results for hybrid hashing here for the sake of completeness. (We
discuss hybrid hashing in detail in Chapter 6.) We also use an end result check
that compares the output of the benchmark with a known correct output and
several software-based static and dynamic bug detection tools as references
for comparison. In hardware simulation, we initialized registers and memories
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to random values, a common technique for enhancing bug detection. Results
of our experiments are enumerated in Table 5.8.
Real bugs were identified by exhaustively exploring the version changes
of CHStone for bug fixes. H-QED also uncovered some previously unknown
bugs in the then-current version of CHStone, 1.10, prompting the release of
1.11, in which H-QED found yet another bug that was introduced. Previously
unknown bugs are highlighted in bold in Table 5.8. For each bug found, we
isolated it by fixing all of the other bugs in the last version of CHStone with
that bug, creating bug benchmarks containing one known bug each. All real
CHStone bugs were confirmed with the CHStone authors.
We also created synthetic bugs in some CHStone benchmarks by violating
interface assumptions made about benchmark inputs (e.g. that the number
of inputs is even). HLS engine bugs were reproduced by modifying our HLS
engine to emulate the original buggy behavior. The FCUDA output bugs
were handled in the same way as the real CHStone bugs: each bug is isolated
into a bug benchmark.
The columns in Table 5.8 are as follows:
 Benchmark: Versions(s) indicates the CHStone benchmark and
version the bug benchmark was based on. For the real CHStone bugs,
the version indicated is the last version of the benchmark containing
the bug.
 Bug Patch Line(s) indicates what line(s) of code were modified to
fix the bug. Canonical bug fixes from version history are used for this
column where applicable. For the synthetic bugs, this column indicates
the line modified to inject the bug.
 Bug Type indicates the root cause classification for the bug. The type
acronyms in this column are defined in Table 5.9.
 Nondet.? indicates whether the bug is non-deterministic, meaning
that the bug behavior is not well defined by standard C [60] semantics
(or only affects the hardware in the case of the two HLS engine bugs).
A “C only” value means that the bug is non-deterministic, but becomes
deterministic after compiler optimizations.
 Act.? indicates if the bug activates during benchmark execution.
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Table 5.8: Evaluation of H-QED and Software Tools against Logic Bugs
Benchmark:
Version(s)
Bug Patch
Line(s)
Bug
Type
Non-
det.?
Act.?
Clang
Cov.
Nondet.
Act. Line
Cpp-
check
Val-
grind
Clang
San.
HT
Line
Com.
Vars
HT
Lat.
HH
Lat.
ER
Lat.
R
ea
l
C
H
S
to
n
e
B
u
g
s
adpcm:1.8 adpcm.c:689 MLU no yes yes N/A - - - N/A N/A N/A N/A yes
gsm:1.4
lpc.c:87 OOB C only yes yes lpc.c:88 - 88 88 - N/A - - -
lpc.c:150 OOB C only yes yes lpc.c:151 - 151 151 - N/A - - -
lpc.c:157 OOB yes yes yes lpc.c:158 - 158 158 158 no 1 77 -
jpeg:1.9
decode.c:204 *++ no no no N/A 204 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
decode.c:205 *++ no no no N/A 205 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
decode.c:209 *++ no no no N/A 209 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
marker.c:0a INIT yes yes yes marker.c:385 - - - 400 N/A 1 - -
mips:1.6 mips.c:172-173 USE no no no N/A - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
mips:1.9
mips.c:102 INIT yes yes no mips.c:179 - - - 179 yes 1 - -
mips.c:103 INIT yes yes no mips.c:182 - - - 182 yes 1 - -
mips:1.10 mips.c:105 INIT yes yes yes mips.c:255 - - - 255 yes 1 22 -
mips:1.11 mips.c:91 OOB yes yes yes mips.c:134 134 - 134 134 yes 1 9 -
motion:1.2 mpeg2.c:225 OOB yes yes yes mpeg2.c:226 - 226 - 226 yes 1 8 91
motion:1.4
getbits.c:113 SHFT C only yes yes getbits.c:113 - - 113 - N/A - - yes
motion.c:155 SHFT C only yes yes motions.c:155 - - 155 - N/A - - -
motion.c:160 SHFT yes yes yes motion.c:160 - - 160
mpeg2.c:
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no 1 15 15
motion.c:166 SHFT yes no no motion.c:166 - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
motion:1.10
getbits.c:134 SHFT yes yes yes getbits.c:134 - - 134 134 yes 0 102 -
getbits.c:144 SHFT yes yes yes getbits.c:144 - - 144 144 yes 0 - -
getbits.c:155 SHFT yes no yes getbits.c:155 - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
S
y
n
th
etic
B
u
g
s
adpcm:1.11 adpcm.c:778 OOB yes yes yes adpcm.c:848 848 854 848 848 yes 1 46 -
aes:1.11 aes.c:83 OOB yes yes yes aes func.c:159 - 140b 159 159 yes -7 362 903
blowfish:1.11 bf pi.h:77 OOB yes yes yes bf enc.c:105 105 - - 105 no 1 180 643
gsm:1.11 gsm.c:32 OOB yes yes yes lpc.c:59 - 59c 59 59 no 1 179 999
jpeg:1.11 huffman.c:86 ZERO no yes yes N/A - - - N/A N/A N/A N/A yes
motion:1.11 mpeg2.c:354 INIT yes yes yes motion.c:68
mpeg2.c:
377
68 68b 68 yes 1 10 168
sha:1.11 sha.h:52 OOB yes yes yes sha.c:84 - - 84 84 no 1 11 857
H
L
S
B
u
g
s
jpeg:1.4 HLS Engine INIT yes yes yes jfif read.c:69 N/A N/A N/A 69 yes 1 122 hang
jpeg:1.11 HLS Engine ZERO yes yes yes huffman.c:118 N/A N/A N/A 118 yes 1 70 811k
matrix-mul:
FCUDA
generated
mm.c:52, 54 BUF no yes yes N/A - - - N/A N/A N/A N/A yes
mm.c:157, 161 INF no yes yes N/A 157, 161 - - N/A N/A N/A N/A hang
mm.c:165-172 OOB yes yes yes memcpy.h:5 - - 5 5 no -1 30 292k
a Bug is the absence of a header file “#include” directive.
b Execution was terminated with a segmentation fault reported at this line.
c add.c:68 is at the top of the reported trace, followed by lpc.c:59.
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Table 5.9: Bug Types
Type Description
MLU Manual loop unrolling omits one iteration
OOB Out-of-bounds array access
*++
Wrongly assuming dereference (*) has higher precedence
than postincrement (++)
INIT Read of uninitialized variable
USE Unintended sign extension
SHFT Bit shift by out-of-bounds amount
ZERO Variable initialized to zero instead of nonzero initializer
BUF Copying from the wrong half of a split buffer
INF Infinite loop due to erroneous loop termination condition
 Clang Cov. The Clang coverage analysis tool [61] provides source-
based dynamic code coverage through code instrumentation that tracks
the execution count for AST nodes. We used the coverage tool in Clang
3.9 with the “Source-based Code Coverage” reference methodology to
determine if code lines relevant to each bug are executed. The “Clang
cov.” column indicates if the non-deterministic activation line is covered.
If the bug is deterministic, this column indicates if the bug patch line(s)
are covered.
 Nondet. Activation Line indicates the line of code, determined by
inspection, where non-deterministic behavior first occurs (e.g. uninitial-
ized variable access, out-of-bounds memory access, etc.).
 Cppcheck [62] is a static analysis tool that detects many kinds of
C/C++ bugs through a battery of static checking heuristics. We ran
Cppcheck 1.76.1 with additional “warning” checks enabled. We report
the first line flagged as a warning or an error by this tool.4 An entry of
“-” means that a technique failed to detect the bug.
 Valgrind [63] is a dynamic binary instrumentation framework with
instrumentation modes that can detect memory errors as well as stack
4 We ignored warnings in the “gsm” benchmark about a function parameter assignment
having no effect outside of the function as inspection of the code showed this kind of coding
style to be intentional. Cppcheck also flags this in the current version (free of all known
bugs) of gsm at lpc.c:308. We also ignored warnings in the FCUDA benchmarks about an
uninitialized struct member as we determined through exhaustive search that this member
was never accessed.
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and global array overruns. We ran two passes of Valgrind 3.11.0 using
the reference methodology provided in the “Valgrind Quick Start Guide”
using GCC 4.9.2 as the source compiler.5 The first pass invoked the
“Memcheck” memory error detection tool and the second invoked the
“SGCheck” experimental stack and global array overrun detector tool.
When Valgrind detects an error, it will indicate the line where the
error occurred with a function call stack below. We report the first
line indicated, except where otherwise noted. Dynamic techniques are
unable to detect unactivated bugs, so we indicate “N/A” for those cases.
 Clang San. Clang also comes with a set of code “sanitizer” tools which
add instrumentation to the code at compile time to detect errors. The
instrumentation then performs checks at runtime to identify various
kinds of memory access and undefined behavior problems. We ran three
passes of Clang with the three relevant sanitizer tools: the AddressSan-
itizer which detects memory errors, the MemorySanitizer which detects
uninitialized reads, and the UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer which detects
undefined behavior. When the sanitizer instrumentation identifies a
problem, it dumps a stack trace similar to Valgrind; we report the first
line indicated.
 HT Line indicates the buggy line as reported by our hybrid tracing
framework. Hybrid tracing is also not applicable for deterministic bugs,
so we indicate “N/A” for those cases.
 Com. Vars indicates if there are variables in common between the HT
Line and the Bug Patch Line(s), indicating a strong hint for a potential
bug fix.
 HT Lat., HH Lat., ER Lat. indicate the error detection latency
for respectively hybrid tracing, hybrid hashing, and the end result
check measured in cycles from non-deterministic bug activation to
detection. For deterministic bugs, hybrid tracing and hybrid hashing
are not applicable, but the end result check still is, although there is
no well-defined non-deterministic bug activation cycle for measuring
5 We found that debugging information generated by GCC was compatible with Valgrind,
while debugging information generated by Clang was not, hence the decision to use GCC
with Valgrind.
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error detection latency, so we indicate with a “yes” entry if the ERC
is able to detect such bugs. An ERC entry of “hang” means that the
benchmark execution fails to terminate.
We also evaluated our bug benchmarks with the Clang static analyzer [64],
which is another source-code analysis tool for finding bugs in C, C++, and
Objective-C programs. We ran the built-in static analyzer in Clang 3.9 using
the “scan-build” wrapper tool. The Clang static analyzer failed to identify
any of our bugs.6
We make the following observations in these results:
1. Of the 21 real CHStone bugs, 16 are non-deterministic, providing
evidence that the “difficult” bugs that escape into releases/production
tend to be non-deterministic.
2. Six of these bugs are not activated, and the Clang coverage analysis
tool detects 5 of those cases.7
3. No tool dominates the others in bug detection and each has unique
strengths. Using a combination of tools is the best way to detect/localize
bugs.
4. Compiler optimizations can complicate bug detection by making non-
deterministic bugs deterministic (e.g. by statically evaluating undefined
behavior and eliminating it).
5. In most cases, the different tools agree on the bug location although
in a few cases compiler optimizations complicate bug localization by
6 The static analyzer did report a number of warnings about values stored in a variable
that were never read. While this is arguably poor coding style, manual inspection of
each flagged line finds no evidence of the dead store being intended to have some effect.
Furthermore, the current version (free of all known bugs) of each benchmark generates the
same warnings.
The static analyzer also complained about several uninitialized variables being read in
the FCUDA matrix multiply benchmark. These same warnings also showed up in the
reference (free of all known bugs) version. We found these claims to be vague and difficult
to investigate by code inspection and thus resorted to empirical methods. We were able to
eliminate these warnings by initializing several variables at the point of allocation. We then
attempted to verify the claims by initializing those same variables with random data and
observing if any failure occurs (incorrect output, or otherwise). No failure was observed
with random initialization.
7At getbits.c:155 a variable range condition that is never met is required for bug
activation.
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making it difficult to map instructions back to source code locations,
resulting in some localization accuracy loss.
6. In 12 out of 19 cases where hybrid tracing reported a buggy line, the
line had at least one variable in common with the bug patch line (or
was the patch line), indicating a strong hint for a fix.
7. Hybrid tracing error detection latency is 1 cycle or less, average hybrid
hashing error detection latency is 83 cycles (all bug benchmarks have a
signature output interval n = 100), and end result check latency can be
thousands of cycles.
8. We observe negative hybrid tracing error detection latency for two OOB
bugs, meaning that hybrid tracing detects activation conditions the
reported number of cycles before bug activation. In both of these cases,
the hardware version of the benchmark computed an out-of-bounds
address one or more cycles before issuing a load for that address. In
the software version, the corresponding address overflowed beyond the
translation table for the variable it was intended to point to, resulting
in the software-to-hardware translation producing a mismatch before
the undefined memory access even occurred.
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CHAPTER 6
POST-SILICON VALIDATION: HYBRID
HASHING
As mentioned in Chapter 4, area and bandwidth costs are the primary
constraints when inserting instrumentation for post-silicon validation of ac-
celerators. We call our post-silicon variation of H-QED hybrid hashing since
we reduce the traces of variable values to a running hash value that is used
to generate a low-bandwidth trickle of “signature” bits. The primary goal of
hybrid hashing is to detect electrical bugs. Hybrid hashing can also detect
most of the logic bugs that hybrid tracing can, but we expect hybrid tracing
to catch most (if not all) non-deterministic logic bugs pre-silicon. While both
of our pre-silicon and post-silicon H-QED solutions can be integrated into an
SoC design, we pay special attention to integration post-silicon because of
the limited testing flexibility of physical hardware compared to pre-silicon
testing.
Figure 6.1 shows an SoC-level view of our hybrid hashing enabled acceler-
ators. The SoC typically consists of processor core(s), accelerator(s) (with
hybrid hashing instrumentation in our case), and uncore components. The
inputs and outputs of the accelerators are supplied by the processor cores
inside the SoC. During PSV, the accelerators generate hardware signatures
that are saved in dedicated on-chip memories (Figure 6.1a). These signatures
are then later compared to a reference set of signatures to detect bugs using
a similar software instrumentation pass as hybrid tracing, but modified to
reproduce the running hashing function and signature generation functionality
of the hardware. Section 6.1 discusses the hybrid hashing process in detail,
and Section 6.3 details a proposed methodology for integrating hybrid hashing
into a post-silicon validation run.
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Figure 6.1: Hybrid hashing instrumented accelerators inside an SoC. (a)
SoC-level view, and (b) block diagram of an instrumented accelerator
showing the accelerator and the signature generator.
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Figure 6.2: Our hybrid hashing framework.
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6.1 Hybrid Hashing Framework
Our hybrid hashing implementation is illustrated in Figure 6.2. The input
to the framework is a high-level design of a hardware accelerator. Again,
as one would expect from an H-QED variant, there are two branches of
the framework, a hardware branch and a software branch. Like the hybrid
tracing process, the hardware branch has an instrumentation pass integrated
into the HLS engine after scheduling. The software branch also involves a
complementary instrumentation pass that takes as input a probe schedule and
a hardware address map from our hardware instrumentation pass to ensure
that it will produce the same signature stream as the hardware under bug-free
conditions. We use the term “probe” instead of “trace” in the context of post-
silicon validation to avoid confusing our high-level hybrid hashing technique
with the many trace-buffer based approaches that perform cycle-granularity
recording of RTL-level signals. (See Section 3.1.2 for a discussion contrasting
hybrid hashing with trace-buffer techniques.)
Unlike hybrid tracing, our hybrid hashing framework is area cost and
bandwidth constrained, and thus adds some twists to reduce these costs. Our
cost reduction strategies are fourfold:
1. Reduce the initial raw signal probing bandwidth by only tracing key
“non-temporary” variables.
2. Use a hybrid multiplexor and XOR tree reduction logic to drastically
reduce the number of probe bits to a small number with minimum area
cost.
3. Use an LFSR to compute a running hash of this reduced signature.
4. Output a single bit checksum computed from the LFSR state every n
cycles (configurable).
As Figure 6.1b shows, our hybrid hashing framework produces an RTL im-
plementation with integrated hashing instrumentation. This instrumentation
generates a sequence of signature bits during a PSV run. Care must be taken
to ensure that the instrumentation does not cause excessive intrusiveness
during PSV, e.g., by stalling the accelerator or by interfering with its input
and output data traffic. Excessive intrusiveness can prevent activation of
bugs inside the accelerator during PSV. In an effort to minimize intrusiveness,
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we store hardware signatures in a dedicated on-chip memory with dedicated
communication channels, as shown in Figure 6.1a.1 The costs associated with
this storage are reported in Section 9.2.
As mentioned earlier, the primary goal of hybrid hashing is to detect
electrical bugs as hybrid tracing will detect most logic bugs while electrical
bugs are likely to escape pre-silicon validation due to the difficulty involved in
accurately modeling and predicting the electrical level behavior of a complex
design. The main problem with electrical bug modeling is that accurate
modeling is too slow to be useful. Indeed even the relatively fast RTL-
level simulation process, which does not model electrical bugs, can have
simulation speeds that are several orders of magnitude slower than real-time
for complex designs. With limited modeling capabilities to detect electrical
bugs pre-silicon, post-silicon validation becomes the last line of defense against
electrical bugs escaping to end-user deployment.
While we find that hybrid tracing of hardware signals that are equivalent to
LLVM-IR variables is sufficient to detect any non-deterministic logic bug that
activates in pre-silicon validation with essentially no error detection latency
(see Section 5.5.3 for a demonstration of this with our bug benchmarks),
electrical bugs activated in post-silicon validation can affect almost any
hardware structure in the hardware accelerator, including the state register.
To ensure that electrical bugs are caught quickly and do not make it past the
outputs of the accelerator undetected, we add additional instrumentation to
the state register as well as the accelerator’s input and output ports. The
intuition here is that if we check all accelerator outputs and periodically check
all “non-temporary” bits of the accelerator’s state, then electrical bugs will
have no place to hide.
We now discuss these additions in detail.
6.1.1 Hardware Execution
The hardware execution is an in-situ test of the fabricated accelerator with
embedded hybrid hashing instrumentation through an existing post-silicon
validation testing harness. Similar to the hybrid tracing process, we start
1 It may be possible to minimize signature storage costs (while controlling intrusiveness)
by streaming hardware signatures to off-chip memory using existing debugging ports, such
as JTAG.
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with an LLVM-IR implementation for the hardware accelerator and perform
instrumentation after scheduling and optimization, but before binding on
an internal hardware IR representation. To reduce the initial raw probing
bandwidth, we only probe variables that are non-temporary. Looking at
the states in the FSM that each variable is live, we define a non-temporary
variable as one that crosses more than one state transition, at least one of
which is a basic block boundary (i.e. the variable is live in more than one
basic block).
Our scheduler prefers to schedule each probe for a variable in its last use
state (last state where it is accessed). The intuition here is to observe the
variable at the last cycle in its lifetime to catch all potential electrical-bug
induced value mutations that could have occurred in earlier cycles before the
value goes into a functional unit where the mutation could be masked. Note
that this contrasts with hybrid tracing instrumentation which targets logic
bugs by observing variable values at the start of their lifetime, right after the
value is generated by some operation, since logic bugs causing variable value
mutations are unlikely. Another goal, however, is to minimize the number of
probe ports carrying these probe signals coming out of the accelerator through
multiplexing. To allocate a minimum number of register probe ports, we use
an algorithm that attempts to create a feasible probe schedule using a single
register probe. We attempt to reschedule probes for variables with the same
use state to predecessor states (where the variable is still live) to produce a
feasible schedule. If scheduling fails, we attempt to schedule again with an
additional probe port and repeat until scheduling succeeds. This algorithm
is similar to our algorithm for scheduling shadow datapath checkpoints in
Chapter 7 (Algorithm 1 on page 74).
After instrumentation, the resulting hardware IR is run through the binding
process to produce a set of shared probe ports for the accelerator’s CDFG
variables. During the RTL generation process of our HLS engine, appropriate
multiplexors are produced for those probe ports. In addition, we add dedicated
probe ports for each accelerator input and output and state machine. As
discussed earlier, these additional ports enable electrical bug detection. Each
probe port outputs a probed value in the states the signal it is probing is live
(i.e. driven to a value that is accessed), zero otherwise to avoid contaminating
the generated signatures with garbage values.
Our HLS engine generates additional RTL for signature generation logic.
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Listing 6.1: Scheduled Operations (custom IR)
<0x1000> g l o b a l [100 x i32 ] Z
<0x2000> g l o b a l [100 x i32 ] B
void bar ( i 32 z ptr , i 32 b ptr ) {
[0−1] i 32 z = load z p t r
[ 1 ] i 32 a = add x , y
[1−2] i 32 b = mul a , z
[2−3] s t o r e b → b ptr
}
As shown in Figure 6.3, signature generation involves a bitwise XOR reduction
of the probe port signals to reduce the number of bits to a small number
with minimum area cost.2 This XOR reducer output is then fed to an LFSR,
which computes a running hash of the reducer output, ensuring that all
probed signal history is captured in this hash, including the cycle timing of
those signals. Periodically, every n cycles (configurable), we output a one-bit
signature from the LFSR.
Assuming that the LFSR has a sufficient number of state bits for the
probability of aliasing inside the LFSR to be negligible, we can compute the
expected time from an error being captured (meaning becoming different
from the error-free value) in the LFSR state to being captured in a signature
bit as follows: After an error is captured in the LFSR state, the average time
until the next signature bit is outputted is n/2. The probability of aliasing in
each signature bit is 1/2 and each alias occurrence costs n cycles of latency.
Thus the expected cycle delay from LFSR error capture to the first signature
bit error capture is
E[sig EDL] =
1
2
n +
∞∑
i=0
i
2i+1
n =
3
2
n (6.1)
Note that the delay distribution decays exponentially, so delays several
times this average are unlikely.
2The probe port multiplexors and XOR reducers can be pipelined as needed with some
number p of additional pipeline registers to meet timing, resulting in p cycles of additional
real-time error detection latency which will add a p cycle delay to a real-time error trigger.
If the signature generation logic is run p cycles behind as well to match the change in the
XOR reducer output timing, this delay will not affect the signatures generated. Thus oﬄine
comparison with reference signatures will have the same result, resulting in an effective
error detection latency overhead of zero.
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Figure 6.3: Example hybrid hashing instrumented accelerator with hardware
signature generation. Probe wires are labeled in red with the basic block and
cycle(s) in which they are probed.
Listing 6.2: Software Trace Operations Added
void bar ( i 32 z ptr , i 32 b ptr ) {
. . .
s o f t w a r e l f s r (1 ⊕ addr convert ( z p t r ) ⊕ z ⊕ x )
s o f t w a r e l f s r (2 ⊕ y )
s o f t w a r e l f s r (3 ⊕ addr convert ( b ptr ) ⊕ b)
}
Table 6.1: Probe Schedule
Func. Block Cycle Const Probed vars
bar bb1
0 1 z ptr, z, x
1 2 y
2 3 b ptr, b
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We illustrate our hardware instrumentation and PSV execution with an
example in Figure 6.3, Listings 6.1–6.2, and Table 6.1. Listing 6.1 provides
an example scheduled hardware IR similar to Listing 5.3 for hybrid tracing.
Table 6.1 is the probe schedule. Note that with one probe port allocated,
both “x” and “y” could not be scheduled in their last use (accessed) cycle,
cycle 1. Thus we rescheduled the probe of “x” for cycle 0. (“z ptr,” “z,”
“b ptr,” and “b” are probed through dedicated memory port probes.)
The probe schedule is similar to the pre-silicon trace schedule in Table 5.3
on page 37, but there are a number of differences. One is that each basic
block in the schedule is broken into cycles which correspond to a state in the
FSM that controls the accelerator. This level of granularity is needed because
the downstream LFSR is sensitive to the cycle the probe values are provided.
Another difference is that there is a fixed constant provided in addition to
the probed variables. This fixed constant is a lumped XOR sum of all of the
values that are fixed in that cycle; in this example, the only constant is the
FSM’s state encoding for that cycle. Finally, no variable IDs are tracked as
variable-value associations are lost in the hashing of all of the probed values.
Figure 6.3 shows the resulting hardware generated by our HLS engine.
Each probe port has a multiplexer associated with it that drives the port
to logic 0 when it is not probed. The select signals of the multiplexer are
derived from the corresponding states annotated in Figure 6.3.
6.1.2 Reference Simulation
As with hybrid tracing, the purpose of reference simulation is to reproduce the
signatures produced by the instrumented hardware under bug-free conditions.
This process is similar to the hybrid tracing variation, with some changes to
the software instrumentation pass.
As with hybrid tracing, the software instrumentation pass takes a hardware
address map and probe schedule as input. Instead of reproducing a trace, the
software instrumentation pass is now tasked with reproducing the hardware’s
signature sequence. In order to do this, the instrumentation pass must
implement the XOR reduction and LFSR in software. We design our hardware
to be software implementation friendly, so the XOR reduction is simply a
software XOR of all of the variables and the constant for a particular state
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while the LFSR is a small series of bit shifts and XOR operations. The
software instrumentation for our example is shown in Listing 6.2. The LFSR
function also mimics exactly the signature output interval of the hardware
LFSR, enabling the software to generate signatures that match the hardware.
6.2 Binding to Minimize Area
Efficient operator and data register sharing are crucial for minimizing hybrid
hashing area costs. We implemented a binding engine which aggressively
shares operators among instructions and registers among variables, as long
as their lifetimes do not overlap, in order to minimize area costs. However,
such sharing introduces multiplexers. Therefore, we developed heuristics to
optimize mux widths for binding by reusing hardware components, wires,
and corresponding mux inputs that have already been allocated (we call it
zero-cost binding). We use a greedy heuristic to exploit zero cost binding
opportunities. Instructions and variables are bound to hardware components
iteratively. During each iteration for instruction or variable binding, we
choose the binding solution with the lowest area cost. We also attempt to
share existing probe ports at the register outputs through zero cost binding
solutions.
6.3 Integration into PSV Testing
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, the limited testing flexibility of
physical hardware compared to the pre-silicon testing of simulated hardware
necessitates a careful consideration of how an accelerator will be tested as an
integral part of an SoC during a PSV run. To demonstrate the practicality of
our approach, we describe a proposed testing procedure as follows.
During PSV, a sequence of hardware signatures is generated and stored in
on-chip memory. The signatures are then collected at the end of the PSV run.
Note that during the PSV run, the hardware accelerator (and the overall SoC)
operates in its native mode. Bugs inside the accelerator are thus expected to
be activated during the PSV run. Next, the software version is executed on a
processor; strategies to provide the same inputs to the software version as the
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hardware accelerator are discussed later in this section. The software version
generates a sequence of software signatures during its execution. Bugs may
or may not be activated during the execution of the software version. Hence,
the execution of the software version can be totally decoupled from the PSV
run. For example, the user may choose to execute the software version on
a different hardware platform vs. the PSV run. The sequence of hardware
signatures obtained from the PSV run is compared with the sequence of
software signatures obtained from the execution of the software version; any
mismatch indicates bug detection. Since the execution of the software version
and the subsequent signature comparisons are totally decoupled from the
PSV run, we minimize possible intrusiveness introduced by hybrid hashing.
In order to ensure that the hardware signatures match the software signatures
(under bug-free conditions), we must ensure that the software version receives
the same inputs as the hardware accelerator. This can be accomplished in
several ways. Two examples include:
1. After a test is executed during a PSV run (in native mode), the SoC
may be configured so that the hardware accelerator is disabled and the
software version is swapped in. Next, the same test can be executed
to generate software signatures. Note that this is different from fail-
ure reproduction because we do not require bugs to be activated (or
reproduced) during the second run.
2. After a test is executed during a PSV run (in native mode), the same test
may be run again with the SoC (and the test) configured to capture (and
store) accelerator inputs at pre-defined memory locations. Using these
captured accelerator inputs, the software version can then be executed
either on the embedded processor core of the SoC being validated, or on
some other processors to generate software signatures. Similar to earlier
discussions, we do not require bugs to be activated (or reproduced) after
the first PSV run.
6.4 Real-time Error Detection
As we discussed in Section 5.3, hybrid tracing can be used as a simulation
breakpoint trigger. In a similar vein, hybrid hashing can be used as a
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trigger to stop hardware execution during a post-silicon validation run when
a bug is detected. This variation of hybrid hashing involves first generating
the reference signature sequence for an accelerator and storing it in the
accelerator’s on-chip signature memory. Instead of writing to the signature
memory, the signature generation logic is configured to read from the signature
memory and perform a realtime signature comparison of the reference and
generated signatures. If a mismatch is found, the signature comparator asserts
a stop trigger, which stops all hardware execution on the SoC and enables
the validation engineer to examine the chip’s state (e.g. by reading out scan
chains). Trace buffers can also be used in conjunction with such a trigger to
provide information about past state (up to and including bug activation if
the error detection latency does not exceed trace buffer capacity).
6.5 Experimental Results
To demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of hybrid hashing we ran
a series of simulation and FPGA-based emulation experiments to collect
data for area and clock period overheads as well as error detection latencies
and coverage estimates for electrical bugs. We used all 12 benchmarks from
CHStone [54] and 15 benchmarks from the PolyBench [54] benchmark suites.
We used a 16-bit LFSR and outputted a single bit hash of the LFSR state at
a regular interval. We fixed the signature output interval of each benchmark
at 100 cycles or the interval that would result in a 5% signature storage area
cost, whichever interval is larger. At the end of benchmark execution, we
dump the full contents of both the hardware and software LFSRs into the
signature stream to ensure that any late LFSR mismatches are detected.
6.5.1 Area and Delay Costs
To determine the area and delay costs of adding hybrid hashing instru-
mentation to an accelerator, we performed HLS with and without hybrid
hashing. We then performed logic synthesis using Synopsys Design Compiler
2013-12.sp1, mapping to a 45 nm ARM standard cell library, and targeting
maximum clock frequency. The area and clock period overheads for each ac-
celerator core are shown in Figure 6.4. Results show a mean accelerator-level
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baseline experimental signature memory normalized chip-level
clock period area clock period area sig bits bits + end lfsr dump
SRAM 
area
area w/
SRAM
zero 
padding
clock 
period area
area w/ 
SRAM area
area w/
SRAM
adpcm 1.277 92,374 1.30 95,335 219 235 74 95,409 0.000 0.016 0.032 0.033 0.007 0.007
aes 0.688 64,923 0.658 69,430 38 54 17 69,447 0.000 -0.044 0.069 0.070 0.015 0.015
atax 0.892 13,434 0.861 15,027 105 121 38 15,065 0.000 -0.035 0.119 0.121 0.025 0.026
bicg 0.903 13,923 0.829 16,047 66 82 26 16,072 0.000 -0.082 0.153 0.154 0.033 0.033
blowfish 0.597 57,418 0.571 59,295 1,792 1,808 570 59,864 0.000 -0.044 0.033 0.043 0.007 0.009
dfadd 0.749 36,348 0.765 39,058 6 22 7 39,065 0.000 0.021 0.075 0.075 0.016 0.016
dfdiv 0.89 94,928 0.865 100,390 19 35 11 100,401 0.000 -0.028 0.058 0.058 0.012 0.012
dfmul 0.691 49,835 0.695 54,172 2 18 6 54,178 0.000 0.006 0.087 0.087 0.019 0.019
dfsin 0.898 163,386 0.889 178,041 545 561 177 178,218 0.000 -0.010 0.090 0.091 0.019 0.020
doitgen 0.847 16,434 0.850 18,062 2,609 2,625 827 18,888 0.000 0.004 0.099 0.149 0.021 0.032
floyd-warsh 0.701 12,764 0.698 13,775 1,712 1,728 544 14,319 0.000 -0.004 0.079 0.122 0.017 0.026
gemm 0.844 13,830 0.856 15,188 1,457 1,473 464 15,652 0.000 0.014 0.098 0.132 0.021 0.028
gemvar 0.998 18,855 1.031 20,220 161 177 56 20,276 0.000 0.033 0.072 0.075 0.016 0.016
gesummv
0.836 13,230 0.844 14,080 64 80 25 14,105 0.000 0.010 0.064 0.066 0.014 0.014
gsm
1.094 109,914 1.111 113,575 52 68 21 113,597 0.000 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.007 0.007
jpeg
1.199 172,344 1.166 179,705 8,605 8,621 2,716 182,421 0.000 -0.028 0.043 0.058 0.009 0.013
matrix4x4 1.03 65,258 1.017 64,355 34 50 16 64,371 0.000 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.003 -0.003
matrix 0.801 11,551 0.8 12,860 328 344 108 12,968 0.000 0.015 0.113 0.123 0.024 0.026
mips 0.912 32,586 0.901 33,698 54 70 22 33,720 0.000 -0.012 0.034 0.035 0.007 0.007
motion 0.643 32,979 0.636 36,081 63 79 25 36,106 0.000 -0.011 0.094 0.095 0.020 0.020
mvt 0.875 16,212 0.878 17,757 86 102 32 17,790 0.000 0.003 0.095 0.097 0.021 0.021
reg-detect 0.931 45,131 0.923 44,993 7,164 7,180 2,262 47,255 0.000 -0.009 -0.003 0.047 -0.001 0.010
sha 0.917 54,017 0.970 57,048 2,559 2,575 811 57,859 0.000 0.058 0.056 0.071 0.012 0.015
symm 0.837 16,943 0.842 18,039 751 767 242 18,281 0.000 0.006 0.065 0.079 0.014 0.017
syr2k 0.848 15,183 0.840 16,469 1,795 1,811 570 17,040 0.000 -0.009 0.085 0.122 0.018 0.026
syrk 0.894 13,975 0.899 15,212 1,467 1,483 467 15,680 0.000 0.006 0.089 0.122 0.019 0.026
trmm 0.834 20,312 0.817 22,442 12 28 9 22,451 0.000 -0.020 0.105 0.105 0.023 0.023
median 0.875 32,586 0.856 33,698 161 177 56 33,720 0.000 -0.004 0.075 0.079 0.016 0.017
mean 0.875 46,966 0.871 49,643 1,176 1,192 376 50,018 0.000 -0.005 0.071 0.083 0.015 0.018
Clock period Signature generation area
Signature storage area
 1
Figure 6.4: Hybrid hashing area and performance overheads.
area cost of 8.3%. We observe no clock period overhead on average.
6.5.2 Electrical Bug Effectiveness
In this section, we present a study of timing errors as representative electrical
bugs. To evaluate the effectiveness of H-QED for detecting such electrical
bugs, we injected timing errors into each of our benchmark designs. Such
a process begins with running each benchmark through HLS with hybrid
hashing, feeding the output RTL code to Design Compiler, and compiling for
timing optimization. To identify timing error activations, we use an approach
similar to the “ground truth” method in [65]: for each flip-flop in the logic
netlist, add a duplicate flip-flop connected to the same “D” input, but with
an additional half-cycle delay on the input. This flip-flop’s “Q” output is
left unconnected as it is used only to trigger reports of timing violations
(by a timing simulator) while the original flip-flops maintain the error-free
execution of the benchmark. We ran timing simulations with the modified
netlist and compiled the timing violations reported into a set of (flip-flop,
cycle) pair, referred to as “injection candidates.” We selected a random subset
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unmasked masked coverage
unactivated undetected detected undetected detected samples ERC H-QED
adpcm 0 2 245 33 220 500 0.494 0.440 0.934
aes 0 2 300 99 99 500 0.604 0.198 0.802
atax 0 0 349 86 65 500 0.698 0.130 0.828
bicg 0 0 324 75 101 500 0.648 0.202 0.850
blowfish 0 1 335 45 119 500 0.672 0.238 0.910
dfadd 0 31 149 145 175 500 0.360 0.350 0.710
dfdiv 0 16 202 168 114 500 0.436 0.228 0.664
dfmul 0 27 129 205 139 500 0.312 0.278 0.590
dfsin 0 1 258 149 92 500 0.518 0.184 0.702
doitgen 0 0 314 18 168 500 0.628 0.336 0.964
floyd-warsh 0 0 255 68 177 500 0.510 0.354 0.864
gemm 0 0 340 13 147 500 0.680 0.294 0.974
gemver 0 0 275 52 173 500 0.550 0.346 0.896
gesummv 0 0 362 14 124 500 0.724 0.248 0.972
gsm 0 2 225 37 236 500 0.454 0.472 0.926
jpeg 0 3 284 59 154 500 0.574 0.308 0.882
matrix 0 0 252 178 70 500 0.504 0.140 0.644
matrix4x4 0 0 391 29 80 500 0.782 0.160 0.942
mips 0 2 173 146 179 500 0.350 0.358 0.708
motion 0 1 80 79 340 500 0.162 0.680 0.842
mvt 0 1 334 19 146 500 0.670 0.292 0.962
reg-detect 0 0 266 50 184 500 0.532 0.368 0.900
sha 0 1 273 58 168 500 0.548 0.336 0.884
symm 0 0 383 15 102 500 0.766 0.204 0.970
syr2k 0 0 314 21 165 500 0.628 0.330 0.958
syrk 0 0 332 17 151 500 0.664 0.302 0.966
trmm 0 1 304 38 157 500 0.610 0.314 0.924
median 0.0 1.0 284.0 52.0 151.0 500.0 0.574 0.302 0.896
mean 0.0 3.4 275.9 71.0 149.8 500.0 0.558 0.300 0.858
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Figure 6.5: Timing error detection coverage.
H-QED End Result Check
latency coverage laten y coverage
1 0.000000 1 0.0000
2 0.002889 2 0.0000
3 0.006222 3 0.0003
4 0.010444 4 0.0003
5 0.013556 5 0.0004
6 0.017037 6 0.0004
7 0.021185 7 0.0007
8 0.024741 8 0.0009
9 0.029111 9 0.0010
10 0.032222 10 0.0012
11 0.036815 11 0.0015
12 0.040148 12 0.0015
13 0.043778 13 0.0016
14 0.046889 14 0.0017
15 0.050148 15 0.0019
16 0.057778 16 0.0023
18 0.065481 18 0.0024
20 0.073037 20 0.0024
22 0.080000 22 0.0030
24 0.086815 24 0.0036
26 0.094074 26 0.0042
28 0.102741 28 0.0044
30 0.109185 30 0.0047
32 0.123630 32 0.0053
36 0.140296 36 0.0059
40 0.155111 40 0.0065
44 0.170296 44 0.0068
48 0.185556 48 0.0070
52 0.202593 52 0.0077
56 0.217704 56 0.0084
60 0.232000 60 0.0090
64 0.263926 64 0.0101
72 0.293556 72 0.0106
80 0.325778 80 0.0115
88 0.358000 88 0.0126
96 0.387704 96 0.0139
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Figure 6.6: Overall timing error coverage as a function of error detection
latency.
of these candidates with size n (we set n = 500) to use in our error injection
experiments. Starting again from the original netlist, we applied another
netlist transform, which inserts XOR gates at the “D” input of flip-flops
corresponding to the selected injection candidates. We added additional logic
to control each XOR gate, enabling error injection at a specific cycle. We
mapped the transformed netlist to an FPGA (Altera Stratix III) for emulation
purposes, and performed n full execution runs for each benchmark, injecting
one error from the selected “injection candidates” during each run (bit flip at
the input of the given flip-flop at the given cycle).
Timing error coverage (the number of errors detected divided by the number
of errors injected) is presented in Figure 6.5, including both masked (errors
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that do not propagate to accelerator outputs so they are invisible externally)
and unmasked errors (errors that propagate to the primary outputs and
affect accelerator results). Note that the unmasked timing error detection
coverage is 100% with hybrid hashing (i.e., we detect all unmasked errors).
The overall error detection latency distribution is shown in Figure 6.6. We
observed mean timing error detection coverage for hybrid hashing of 85.8%
compared to 55.8% for the end result check, resulting in a 3.1× improvement
(i.e., reduction) in undetected timing errors. We also observed a mean error
detection latency of 705 cycles for hybrid hashing, compared to 124,490 cycles
for end result check, resulting in a 176× improvement (i.e., reduction) in error
detection latency.
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CHAPTER 7
POST-DEPLOYMENT RESILIENCE:
MODULO-3 SHADOW DATAPATHS
In this chapter, we propose creating a redundant, but smaller “shadow”
datapath based on modulo arithmetic to detect reliability problems in an
HLS design’s main datapath. We automate the creation of this “shadow”
datapath through a series of modulo-3 shadow datapath HLS transformations.
Our main innovations are:
 Intelligent scheduling of intermediate register consistency checks for
maximum coverage with minimum checker allocation
 Support for mixed arithmetic/non-arithmetic data paths
 A register-duplication based checkpointing technique to demonstrate
the error correction potential of our approach
 An FPGA accelerated, fully automated error injection framework using
a gate-netlist transformation to enable accelerated injection for three
fault models
 Error detection latencies three orders of magnitude faster than an end
result check
 Unmasked error detection coverage of 99.42% for an assortment of three
different kinds of fault models
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.1 explains the
method we use to perform our error detection and correction transformations
and Section 7.2 discusses our experimental setup and results.
7.1 Framework
Our approach to protecting a hardware design is a series of modulo-3 shadow
datapath HLS transformations. An overview of how these transformations
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Modulo-3 Transform
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(a) HLS Overview
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Figure 7.1: Overview of our method. (a) Integration of our reliability
transformations into the high-level synthesis process. (b) Illustration of our
core mod-3 transform. The original datapath is colored black/white and the
shadow datapath is in blue.
fit into the HLS process is illustrated in Figure 7.1a. We use the LegUp
HLS scheduling engine [58] to schedule the original datapath, and perform
binding with our in-house binding engine. Our transformations involve some
additional scheduling steps (see Section 7.1.2). We perform our error detection
transformations after scheduling but before binding to ensure that the latency
of the hardware function does not increase.
Figure 7.1b provides an overview of our basic modulo-3 shadow datapath
transformation. For each input port, we add a mod-3 reducer to compute
the input value mod-3 residue, effectively creating a shadow mod-3 input.
For each arithmetic functional unit (e.g. add, subtract, multiply), we add
a corresponding shadow mod-3 functional unit. For each datapath flip-flop,
we add a corresponding 2-bit flip-flop to store and propagate the mod-3
checksum in a parallel datapath. For each output port, we add a mod-3
checker which consists of a reducer and 2-bit equality comparator, which
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Table 7.1: Modulo-3 Adder Functional Specification Table
value encoding
0 00
1 01
2 10
U 11
+3 0 1 2 U
0 0 1 2 X
1 1 2 0 X
2 2 0 1 X
U X X X X
Table 7.2: Optimization Results for Shadow Mod-3 Units
Function
32-bit unit naive shadow optimized shadow
area delay area delay area delay
Add 163 1.30 17.6 0.15 9.30 0.08
Multiply 2381 2.05 10.9 0.08 5.75 0.05
then drives shared error ports. The result is that each main computation is
independently performed in mod-3 space, and the two results are checked
for consistency. In the following two subsections, we discuss the design of
these mod-3 functional units and the transformation that inserts them into
high-level synthesized designs.
7.1.1 Modulo-3 Functional Units
Basic Functional Units
Mod-3 functional units represent the types of functional units which operate
in the mod-3 space. Since only two bits are required to encode three possible
values in mod-3 space, a simple approach is to use two representations for
0: 00 and 11, which is the approach taken for previous designs of mod-3
functional units. Our key innovation is to ignore the 11 encoding (we name
it the U value) and optimize it as a don’t care, meaning that there are no
constraints on the output given a U input.
Thus if either input is the U value, then the output does not matter as the
U case will never occur in normal operation. As illustrated in Table 7.1 for
the mod-3 adder, there are nine fixed output cases and seven don’t care output
cases for each two-input mod-3 unit. Through the use of Karnaugh maps, we
optimally exploited these don’t cares to find a low area cost design expressed
as a sum of products. We verified the optimality of our sum of products
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Table 7.3: Shadow Unit Metrics for Operation with Constant c
Function
c = 0 c = 1 c = 2
area delay area delay area delay
Add c 0 0 0.96 0.02 0.96 0.02
Multiply by c 0 0 0 0 0 0
solution through an exhaustive search of all 47 possible don’t care assignments
(i.e. to check for better solutions involving compound gates). Table 7.2 shows
the effects of our optimization. For logic synthesis, we implemented our
designs in Verilog, used Synopsys Design Compiler 2013-12.sp4 with an ARM
45 nm standard cell library, and optimized for minimum area. We measure
area in square micrometers and delay in nanoseconds.
Constant Functional Units
We also consider an additional class of constant operation units generated by
high-level synthesis, units that have a constant as one input. We can think of
this constant as “baked-in” to the logic of the unit so that structurally the
unit has a single input and a single output. For example, a +10 constant
operation unit takes some value x as input and outputs x + 10.
Table 7.3 shows the cost of the constant operation versions of our mod-3
units. Since we can reduce each constant to its mod-3 residue at compile
time, there are only three versions of each constant unit. We observe that
the operations +0 and ×1 have no area cost since they lower to the identity
function and ×0 lowers to the constant zero for multiplication. As discussed
in Section 7.1.2, such operations are optimized out by our high-level synthesis
optimization passes.
With such functional unit optimizations, our method has an even greater
area-cost advantage over double or triple modular redundancy for arithmetic
datapaths.
Modulo-3 Reducers
Mod-3 reducers are our modulo-3 residue computing units. They are imple-
mented as a tree of dlog n/2e stages of modulo-3 adders where n is the input
width, similar to the tree approach in [48]. An example reducer for n = 16 is
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x mod 3
Figure 7.2: Optimized mod-3 reducer topology for a 16-bit unsigned reducer.
Optimized mod-3 adders are colored blue.
Table 7.4: Optimization Results for 32-bit Mod-3 Reducer
Reducer Type
[48] ours
area delay area delay
Unsigned 263 0.62 203 0.46
Signed 267 0.66 207 0.51
illustrated in Figure 7.2. The design works by grouping the input bits into
pairs and effectively constructing a base 22 = 4 representation of the input
value. Since 4n mod 3 = 1 for all n ≥ 0, each base 4 digit has the same weight
in mod-3 space and thus we can compute the mod-3 sum of all of the digits
in a straightforward tree reduction.
Since the first stage adders must take all possible values (0, 1, 2, and 3)
as inputs, we cannot perform don’t care optimizations for those units. But
since we design the first stage adders to normalize their output to be 0, 1,
or 2, all subsequent stages can optimize the fourth (“3” or U) value as a
don’t care. To the best of our knowledge, this optimization was not previously
explored. With this optimization, we observe a 22-23% area cost reduction
and a 23-26% delay reduction compared to [48].
Thus far, we have assumed that the original datapath uses an unsigned
bit encoding for all variables. To modify our reducers to handle a signed
(2s complement) variable, we leverage that the only difference between the
unsigned and signed (2s complement) encodings is the weight of the most
significant bit (MSB). In the unsigned encoding, the MSB has a weight of
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2n−1 while in the signed encoding, it has a weight of −2n−1 where n is the
number of bits. Without loss of generality, if we assume n is even, then
2n−1 mod 3 = 2 and −2n−1 mod 3 = 1. Since the second most significant bit
always has a weight of 1, the insertion of a half-adder is sufficient to normalize
the two most significant bits for a signed reducer. Table 7.4 shows the small
cost of this extra half-adder.
7.1.2 High-Level Synthesis Transformations
Our HLS transformations, as illustrated in Figure 7.1 on page 67, consist
of a core mod-3 transform that generates the shadow datapath, as well as
some dataflow-level optimization passes on the generated mod-3 logic. Our
transformations operate on a scheduled control/data flow graph.
By leveraging the state machine and data flow graph information available
in this HLS stage, we can perform transformations and optimizations not
possible at the RTL or gate-level stage. In the following subsections, we discuss
how we handle mixed arithmetic-nonarithmetic datapaths, the scheduling of
intermediate register consistency checks for maximum coverage with optimized
sharing, pipelining for deferred shadow datapath scheduling to eliminate clock
period overhead and lower area cost, and binding diversity between the main
and shadow datapaths for improved fault coverage.
Handling Non-Arithmetic Components
HLS generated designs involve non-arithmetic components including state
machine logic, bitwise operations, and comparators that have single bit out-
puts. Each non-arithmetic component is duplicated such that each component
has a redundant counterpart. However, such units have low area overhead.
For example, bitwise operations have very low area cost and shifts by a
constant have zero area cost. We also observe low overheads for duplication
of non-arithmetic units (Area and Delay overheads are mentioned in Table 7.5
on page 79).
There are a number of cases to deal with when we generate shadow connec-
tions for arithmetic and non-arithmetic components, which are illustrated in
Figure 7.3. Connections between two duplicate components and between two
mod-3 components are straightforward: just make connections corresponding
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(a) non → non
%3
⨉ ⨉ 
(b) non → arith
+ + 
(c) arith → non
+ + 
⨉ ⨉
(d) arith → arith
Figure 7.3: Shadow/duplicate connection cases. For each subfigure, the
original graph is on the left and the redundant logic is on the right. For the
redundant logic, nonarithmetic components (“non”) are duplicated with the
duplicates in gray. Arithmetic components (“arith”) are mod-3 shadowed
with the shadows in blue. The unit labeled “%3” is a mod-3 reducer.
to those in the original datapath (Figures 7.3a and 7.3d). We can connect a
duplicate component output (full bit width) to a mod-3 component input (2
bit) through a mod-3 reducer (Figure 7.3b). Connecting a mod-3 component
output to a duplicate component input is not possible since information lost
in the mod-3 reduction cannot be recovered. Thus the duplicate component
input is connected to the same output as the original component (Figure 7.3c).
Making connections this way can leave some mod-3 components with
outputs unconnected, which we call mod-3 sinks. For example, the mod-3
adder in Figure 7.3c may not have a mod-3 component to connect to in its
fanout. Such mod-3 sinks may output an inconsistent mod-3 checksum due
to an error that occurred in the main datapath, but there would be no way to
detect it. Thus we add a mod-3 checker for each mod-3 sink to ensure such
errors are detected.
We deal with constant multiplication by multiples of three in a similar
way since the mod-3 result is always zero (Section 2.2.2). Our optimization
passes will replace such a shadow multiplier with a constant, leaving no pin
to connect its original input to. Thus we treat constant multiplication by a
multiple of three as an additional shadow datapath barrier: if it results in a
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mod-3 sink then we add a mod-3 checker.
Register Consistency Check Scheduling
Some errors may be masked in the main datapath (and thus masked in the
shadow datapath) before they reach the primary output. Other errors may be
unmasked, but undetected due to aliasing (see Section 2.2.2) that occurs in
the shadow datapath. To maximize our chances of detecting such errors, we
insert checkers on the output of datapath registers, using strategic scheduling
of check operations to share as many mod-3 reducers as possible.
Compared to the rest of the shadow datapath, reducers are expensive
(Compare Tables 7.2 and 7.4). Reducers are scheduled in fixed states for
use at output ports and mod-3 sinks to produce residues for checkers as
well as at input ports to provide shadow inputs (Figure 7.1b). Intermediate
register checkpoints, on the other hand, have flexible scheduling constraints
corresponding to their liveness state machine subgraph.
To exploit this flexibility and minimize reducer allocation, we select register
liveness intervals that are more than one cycle long and that extend across
a basic block boundary (control flow divergence or convergence). For each
liveness interval, we attempt to schedule a checkpoint at each use (read) of
the corresponding SSA variable1 with the constraint that we cannot schedule
more reducers at a state than have been allocated. The intuition behind this
method is that we want to catch errors right before they leave a register to
go through functional units where they may be masked or aliased. If the
checkpoint cannot be scheduled at a state, we attempt to recursively schedule
it at each of the state’s predecessors.
The core recursive algorithm is listed in Algorithm 1. In the event of a
scheduling failure, we allocate an additional reducer and try again until check
scheduling succeeds.
Pipelining for Deferred Shadow Datapath Scheduling
While our mod-3 shadow functional units have low latency (Tables 7.2 and 7.3),
our mod-3 reducers have high latency (Table 7.4). In addition, the insertion
1Single-static assignment variable which is written only once and thus corresponds to
one liveness interval for a variable.
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Algorithm 1 Core Recursive Scheduling Algorithm
function schedule(var, state)
if (var, state) has not been visited or scheduled then
if reducer count[state] = max reducers then
preds ← state predecessors that var is live in
if preds = ∅ then
increment max reducers
restart scheduling process
end if
for each pred in preds do
schedule(var, pred)
end for
else
schedule check for (var, state)
increment reducer count[state]
end if
end if
end function
of a mod-3 checker on a mod-3 sink’s corresponding main component can
cause severe timing violations if the main component is part of an operation
chain. Even if the timing violations are corrected through gate sizing, the
area cost can be quite large as 1× transistors are replaced with 4× and 8×
transistors to meet timing requirements. Ideally, we want all of the mod-3
components to be mapped to 1× gates for minimum area overhead.
Thus our solution is to insert pipeline flip-flops both in front of and behind
each mod-3 reducer. The shadow datapath schedule is then deferred by two
cycles, adding two cycles of error detection latency in exchange for reduced
area cost.
Shadow Datapath Optimization Passes
Our mod-3 transformation can create no-op identity operations and redundant
components. This superfluousness motivated us to add a shadow datapath
optimization pass to eliminate them as shown in Figure 7.1a which consists
of two components:
1. Constant propagation and identity elimination: A +6 adder
results in the generation of a +0 mod-3 component, which is an identity.
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A ×6 multiplier evaluates to a constant 0 in mod-3 space, which could
then propagate to other operations and make their result evaluable at
compile time.
2. Redundant component elimination: A ×8 and a ×11 multiplier
both result in the generation of a ×2 mod-3 component. If both
multipliers are connected to the same input, the second ×2 mod-3
component is redundant and can be removed.
Diverse Binding
We perform binding of our optimized and scheduled control and data flow
graph with our in-house binding engine, which creates diverse (different)
binding solutions between the original and duplicate / mod-3 datapaths. Such
diverse binding makes it difficult for control errors and stuck-at faults to affect
both redundant datapaths in the same way. Further state machine checking
is enabled by comparing the state registers of the redundant state machines
and using one state machine to control the main datapath and another one
to control the duplicate and shadow datapaths. Both the shadow datapath
and the duplicate state machine run two cycles behind the main computation,
so synchronization is not an issue. The binding engine’s primary goal is to
maximize sharing where profitable for area cost, minimizing the number of
reducers allocated.
7.1.3 Recovery
To enable error recovery for soft errors, we use a checkpoint and recovery
register transformation, illustrated in Figure 7.4. For each state and datapath
register, we add a duplicate register to store checkpoint data. At regular
intervals (configurable), we assert the “save” signal to take a snapshot of
the state of each datapath and state register in a corresponding duplicate.
Error detection triggers a “restore” signal which recovers the state from the
previously recorded checkpoint, i.e. the cycle where the “save” signal was
asserted.
Our error recovery technique will work for soft errors as long as the error
has not made it into the checkpoint snapshot. A checkpoint is corrupted when
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Figure 7.4: Flip-flop transformation for soft error recovery.
an error is activated before but detected after the checkpoint. We consider an
error to be masked if it does not affect the primary outputs of the generated
core or the timing of those outputs. Otherwise, it is an unmasked error.
The probability of checkpoint corruption, PCC , is defined as in Equation
(7.1), where l is the unmasked error detection latency, Pl is the probability
of that particular latency (i.e.
∑
l Pl = 1) and CI is the checkpoint interval
(configurable). An error is removed if either it is masked to begin with or
it is unmasked, detected, and successfully recovered by rolling back to an
uncorrupted checkpoint; we formally define the error removal rate as the
number of removed errors divided by number of total errors, as formalized
in Equation (7.2). In this equation, E is the error removal rate; M is
the error masking rate (defined as the number of masked errors divided by
number of total errors); and U is the unmasked error detection rate (defined
as number of unmasked errors detected divided by number of total errors).
An error is detected (ED) in a given cycle if an error occurred in that cycle
and it was detected by our detection logic, as formalized in Equation (7.3),
where Perror stands for the probability of error activation in each cycle and
det stands for total error detection rate given error activation. Avg.rollback
is the number of cycles, on average, that we would rollback on detection
of an error. Since the rollback length distribution is uniform, the average
is approximately half the checkpoint interval (Equation (7.4)). Thus, the
average rollback cycle overhead is the product of the average rollback length
and the probability of an error being detected in a given cycle (Equation
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(7.5)).
PCC =
∑
l
Pl
min(l,CI)
CI
≤ lavg
CI
(7.1)
E = M + U(1− PCC) (7.2)
ED = Perror × det. (7.3)
Avg. Rollback =
CI∑
r=1
r
CI
=
CI + 1
2
(7.4)
Cycle Overhead = ED× Avg. Rollback (7.5)
7.2 Results and Analysis
7.2.1 Setup
Our experimental setup is illustrated in Figure 7.5. We performed logic
synthesis with Synopsys Design Compiler 2013-12.sp1 with an ARM 45 nm
standard cell library and optimized for maximum clock frequency. We eval-
uated the detection coverage of our approach with error injection enabling
netlist transformations which support stuck-at, transient, and timing errors.
To inject stuck-at faults, the netlist transformation inserts AND (for stuck-
at 0) or OR (for stuck-at 1) gates at randomly selected gate outputs. To inject
transient errors, we insert XOR gates at the “D” inputs of randomly selected
flip-flops. For timing errors, we induce setup time violations by performing
timing simulations with a fast clock to collect flop-cycle pairs where timing
errors are activated while continuing error-free execution with the use of a
razor flip-flop like transformation, similar to the activation detection method
of [65]. Then we pass these flop-cycle pairs as a subset of transient errors to
our error injection enabling netlist transformation.
To accelerate fault effect evaluation, we map the ASIC netlist to an Altera
Stratix III FPGA for emulation. A hardware test driver module mapped to
the FPGA communicates with the host system to facilitate thousands of rapid
(<1 second each) back-to-back full runs of the design under test, injecting
one error from the sample list at a time. As one would expect, stuck-at faults
are activated for the duration of the design execution, while transient errors
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Figure 7.5: Our error detection coverage evaluation framework. Our
“reliability-centric” high-level synthesis process is elaborated in Figure 7.1a.
Our customized steps are highlighted in yellow.
are activated for one cycle.
7.2.2 Results
We used benchmarks from the PolyBench/C 3.2 benchmark suite [66] and
modified the benchmarks to use fixed-point encodings for originally floating-
point encoded values as our transformations currently do not support floating-
point operations. We implemented fixed point arithmetic with C integer
arithmetic operations with shifts for binary point alignment. “Matrix 4 ×
4” is a tiled version of the matrix multiply benchmark that completely
unrolls 4× 4 tiles to explore performance/area tradeoff. We synthesized our
benchmarks using our method (Section 7.1.2) and used our experimental
setup (Section 7.2.1).
To determine the area cost of our error detection approach, we compare
the core area of an unprotected baseline benchmark synthesized without our
mod-3 shadow datapath transformations against our experimental version
synthesized with the mod-3 transforms. Table 7.5 shows the area and clock
period overhead for both the detection logic and estimated overhead (through
characterization of the hardware in Figure 7.4) for the total logic which
includes both detection and recovery. We observe on average an area cost
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Table 7.5: Area and Clock Period Overhead Results
Benchmark
Baseline Detection Total
area
(µm2)
period
(ns)
area
ov.(%)
period
ov.(%)
area
ov.(%)
period
ov.(%)
Atax 13 434 0.89 28.3 −2.4 52.7 2.0
Bicg 13 923 0.90 27.4 −5.2 57.6 −0.9
Floyd-Warsh 12 764 0.70 26.9 0.3 57.4 5.8
Gemm 13 380 0.84 30.3 1.7 56.4 6.3
Gemver 18 855 1.00 26.8 1.5 55.4 5.4
Gesummv 13 230 0.84 30.0 1.9 57.1 6.6
Matrix 4× 4 65 258 1.03 5.7 8.8 29.5 12.6
Matrix 11 151 0.80 22.1 1.0 55.6 5.9
Mvt 16 212 0.88 40.2 −1.1 67.9 3.3
Symm 16 943 0.84 24.9 2.9 57.2 7.5
Syr2k 15 183 0.85 23.0 1.2 48.9 5.8
Syrk 13 975 0.89 23.1 0.1 48.9 4.5
Median 13 949 0.86 26.8 1.1 56.0 5.8
Mean 18 763 0.87 25.7 0.9 53.7 5.4
of 25.7% for detection and estimate 53.7% for both detection and recovery.
Interestingly, we observe a 5.7% detection area cost for the highly parallelized
“Matrix 4× 4” benchmark, suggesting that lower overheads are achievable in
large high-throughput accelerator designs.
To observe fault coverage, we injected a sampling of 2,000 stuck-at, 10,000
transient, and 10,000 timing errors into each synthesized core. The outcome
of our fault injection experiments is shown in Table 7.6.
For unmasked errors, we observe an average stuck-at fault coverage of
99.1%, soft error coverage of 99.5%, and timing error coverage of 99.6%. To
provide some context, Argus, which we consider to be a state-of-the-art error
detecting microprocessor, can detect 98.0% of transient errors and 98.8% of
stuck-at faults [42].
It is difficult to make a direct comparison with previous HLS work since
high-level synthesis benchmarks with experimental error injection and area
cost are quite limited. For reference, Concurrent Error Detection [40] uses
HLS to fully duplicate each component but attempts to compensate for area
cost through resource sharing and has around 75% area cost for a simple,
fully arithmetic datapath which in theory is not susceptible to aliasing.
Figure 7.6 shows the estimated soft error removal rate and rollback cycle
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Table 7.6: Fault Coverage
Benchmark
Unmasked (%) Masked (%)
stuck trans. timing stuck trans. timing
Atax 99.7 99.8 99.8 68.6 28.3 65.0
Bicg 98.9 97.1 100 73.9 31.1 57.4
Floyd-Warsh 99.9 100 100 64.8 40.9 73.4
Gemm 98.5 100 100 100 31.8 77.2
Gemver 99.5 99.9 100 78.0 18.8 77.5
Gesummv 99.9 99.3 100 67.6 38.4 56.1
Matrix 4× 4 98.8 98.7 99.5 67.7 48.9 76.5
Matrix 100 100 100 76.1 25.9 54.1
Mvt 96.7 100 100 73.4 17.0 66.9
Symm 99.6 99.0 97.7 76.8 36.4 47.7
Syr2k 99.5 99.7 98.9 73.5 33.5 81.7
Syrk 98.5 100 100 71.4 31.9 73.2
Median 99.5 99.9 100 72.8 31.8 70.0
Mean 99.1 99.5 99.6 72.0 31.9 67.2
overhead for our error recovery method with checkpoint intervals ranging
from 10 to 100 k cycles calculated through Equations (7.1)-(7.5).
The baseline average masking rate of the unmodified designs is 70.2%
(indicated by the lower dotted line), and we achieve an total error removal
rate (indicated by the “Error Removal Rate” curve) arbitrarily close to the
theoretical upper bound (all errors detected are corrected) which is 99.83%
(indicated by the upper dotted line).
We cannot achieve an error removal rate of 100% as we have a small
percentage of undetected, unmasked errors. The four parallel lines represent
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Figure 7.6: Error removal rate and rollback cycle overhead.
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Figure 7.7: Soft error detection latency distribution.
rollback cycle overheads for different soft error rates. For reference, [67]
reports a worst-case error rate of around 10−16 errors / cycle for a space
environment assuming a clock frequency of 1 GHz.
What is interesting to observe is the tradeoff between the error removal rate
and rollback cycle overhead. Larger checkpoint intervals reduce the chance of
checkpoint corruption, resulting in higher error removal rates. At the same
time, large checkpoint intervals result in larger jumps back in time for each
error detection triggered rollback, resulting in larger cycle overheads. To
pick a number, 1000 cycles is a reasonable tradeoff as we are at the point of
diminishing returns for the error removal rate (98.6%).
Figure 7.7 shows the soft error detection latency distribution for unmasked
errors, masked errors and both. “End Result Check” (ERC) is a basic
error detection method involving comparing the benchmark’s output with its
expected output once execution is complete. We observe mean latencies of
8.72, 17.14, 12.75, and 36 2 k cycles for unmasked, masked, both and ERC
respectively, for an error detection latency improvement of 4150× over the
ERC.
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CHAPTER 8
CHEAPER MODULO FUNCTIONAL
UNITS
While the area cost of our modulo shadow datapaths in Chapter 7 is much
better than traditional modular redundancy approaches, we want to maximize
the applicability of our approach. To this end, we take a dive into gate-level
architectural design for modulo arithmetic functional units. In this chapter,
we create new cost-effective gate-level designs for Mersenne (M(n)) modulo
functional units (see Section 2.2.4 for definition), and show that we cannot only
decrease the cost for modulo-3 shadow datapaths, but also enable practical
scaling to larger shadow datapath widths. To demonstrate the applicability
of our approach for reliability, we use these building blocks to create a
self-checking multiply-accumulate datapath.
8.1 Modulo Functional Units Architecture
The following subsections discuss our gate-level architectures for our modulo
M(n) integer reducers, adders, multipliers, negators, and zero comparator
functional units. All of these functional units work with non-normalized
n-bit encodings (see Section 2.2.6 for definition) for residues modulo M(n).
Furthermore, we provide illustrated examples with specific values of n for
explanatory purposes, but these architectures generalize in a straightforward
manner (except where noted otherwise) to any n ≥ 2 and any input bitwidth
w ≥ 2n.
8.1.1 Reducer
Our reducer functional units compute y = a mod M(n), where a is a w-bit
wide datapath value, and y is an n-bit residue value.
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Figure 8.1: Wallace-tree like reduction strategy and 16 bit modulo-3 reducer.
In (a), each square represents a bit, and the number in the square is the
weight of that bit. In (b), each “2× FA” box represents a pair of full adders,
one taking three bits of weight 1 as input and one taking three bits of weight
2. Each wire (except the top input bundle) bundles two bits of weights 1 and
2.
Reduction Strategy
To perform this reduction to a residue, our unique approach is a Wallace-tree
like reduction strategy shown in Figure 8.1a. Our reducer starts with a
standard bit sequence representing an integer with bits having weights with
successive powers of two. Using the standard homomorphism from integer
arithmetic to modulo arithmetic (see Section 2.2.1), we can reduce the weights
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Algorithm 2 Partial Modulo Reduction
procedure reduce(A) . A is a m× n matrix of bits
while |A| ≥ 3 do . |A| is the number of rows in A
G← row triplets selected from A.
L← leftover rows, |L| < 3.
G′ ← G passed through n× FA blocks.
A← {G′, L}.
end while
return A . The result is a 2× n matrix of bits
end procedure
in Equation (2.7) to residues as follows:
y =
(
w−1∑
i=0
2iai
)
mod M(n) (8.1)
=
(
w−1∑
i=0
(2i mod M(n))an
)
mod M(n) (8.2)
=
(
w−1∑
i=0
(2i mod n)an
)
mod M(n) (8.3)
where the last equivalence follows from Equation (2.6).
In other words, the weights on the input bits shown in Figure 8.1a are
reduced to a repeating cycle of successive powers of two, drawn as a 4 × 2
matrix in Figure 8.1a for n = 2 and M(n) = 3. We now feed these bits to
full adder (FA) gates. A full adder takes three bits of weight w as input
and produces two bits as output: one of weight w and another of weight
2w. A FA is a transistor-level optimized cell in a standard cell library that
reduces the number of bits by 1 (3 inputs less 2 outputs), and as we will see
shortly, performs arithmetic amenable to a modulo context. Thus FAs are
ideal technology mapping targets for cost-effective modulo arithmetic.
In the 4× 2 matrix in Figure 8.1a, we can select two groups of 3 bits with
the same weight (highlighted in red) and pass them through full adders. The
result is two bits of weight 2, one bit of weight 1, and one bit of weight 4.
But 4 = 1 (mod 3) (an example of Equation (2.6)), so the output of the FAs
is equivalent to two bits of weight 1 as well as 2. Since we also have two
bits left over from the input, we now have a 3× 2 matrix of bits (lower left
corner of Figure 8.1a). We repeat this process, selecting groups of 3 bits and
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putting them through FAs until no groups of 3 bits remain. This process is
formalized in Algorithm 2.
Intuitively, it is desirable to perform reductions with entirely full adders
since each FA gate is doing useful work reducing the number of bits by 1. Half
adders (HA) take two bits of the same weight, w, as input and produce two
bits of weights w and 2w and thus do not by themselves reduce the number
of bits.
Architecture
Figure 8.1b provides a block diagram for our Mersenne modulo reducer gate-
level architecture for n = 2 =⇒ M(n) = 3 and input width w = 16. Each
wire (except the top input bundle) corresponds to a bundle for a bit matrix
row in Figure 8.1a if it were to be expanded from an 8-bit input to a 16-bit
input. Three wires representing three rows are connected to corresponding
bundles of FAs (the “2 × FA” blocks) which generate two rows (wires) of
output. Note that, perhaps counterintuitively, the two output wires of each
“2×FA” block in Figure 8.1b represent bundles with all of the different possible
bit weights (i.e. a row of a bit matrix in Figure 8.1a), not a bundle of sum
bits and a bundle of carry bits.
Using the reduction strategy in Algorithm 2, we iteratively process all
of the groups of three wires from the previous stage in parallel by passing
them through “2× FA” blocks until only two wires remain. Note that while
Figure 8.1b provides an example for n = 2 =⇒ M(n) = 3 and input width
w = 16, along with our other functional units in this section, this example
generalizes to any n ≥ 2 and any w ≥ 2n.1 For the final reduction stage, we
use a binary modulo adder, which we discuss next.
8.1.2 Adder
Our gate-level modulo binary adder architecture is shown in Figure 8.2a
for n = 3 =⇒ M = 7. The first stage is a standard ripple-carry adder.
1For w values that are not a multiple of n, we can pad the input with conceptual
constant zero bits until w mod n = 0. Each of those zero bits will be connected to a
different full-adder, so we can recover from most of the padding overhead by optimizing
those full adders with one constant zero bit to half adders.
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Figure 8.2: Modulo-7 adder, multiplier, and zero comparator. In (b) bits are
annotated with their weights. Each X represents a 2-input AND gate with
inputs connect on the left, and outputs connected on the right.
The final carry produced by the first stage has weight 2n = 1 (mod M)
by Equation (2.6), so it wraps around as a carry-in to the second stage.
We guarantee under all possible adder input combinations that this carry
circulation will stop before or at the most significant bit in the second stage.
In other words, at most one of the input bits to the MSB adder gate in the
second stage is a 1. We call an adder gate with this input constraint a quarter
adder (QA) and implement it with a 2-input OR gate.
Theorem 1. At most one of the inputs to the quarter adder gate in our
modulo binary adder is 1.
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Proof. We prove this guarantee by contradiction. Suppose both inputs to the
QA are 1. Then both inputs to each half adder in the second stage must be
1. Then all inputs to each full adder in the first stage must be 1. Then both
outputs of the half adder in the first stage must be 1, which is impossible.
8.1.3 Multiplier
Refer to Figure 8.2b for our modulo binary multiplier architecture for n =
3 =⇒ M = 7. The multiplier is like an array multiplier with a twist: each
combination of input bits is combined with a 2-input AND gate, but bit
weights wrap around modulo M , resulting in a n×n matrix of partial product
bits as shown in the upper part of Figure 8.2b, which also corresponds to the
lower-left corner. For example, the product of the two bits of weight 22 = 4
will have weight 24 = 16 = 21 = 2 (mod 7) by Equation (2.6).
Since the output is a square matrix of bits, we can then apply our reduction
techniques from Section 8.1.1 to reduce them. Figure 8.2b elaborates on the
reduction for a 3× 3 matrix of 9 bits.
8.1.4 Negation and Subtraction
Negation with our encodings of Mersenne modulo numbers is quite simple:
just pass each bit through a NOT gate. Mathematically, this works because
−a = M − a = (2n − 1)−
n−1∑
i=0
2iai (8.4)
=
n−1∑
i=0
2i −
n−1∑
i=0
2iai =
n−1∑
i=0
2i(1− ai) (mod M) (8.5)
These NOT gates can be integrated into gates in upstream or downstream
functional units to effectively eliminate their overhead (e.g., flip-flops with
inverted outputs or NAND gates instead of AND gates in a multiplier array).
Subtraction is implemented as a composition of negation and addition, i.e.
a− b = a + (−b).
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8.1.5 Zero Comparator
We created a custom architecture for a zero comparator which takes 2n bits as
input and compares the sum of the 2× n matrix of bits with zero, illustrated
in Figure 8.2c for n = 3 =⇒ M = 7. We take 2n bits as input due to the
extra cost of reducing 2n bits to n bits (see Section 8.2.2).
Theorem 2. Our zero comparator architecture illustrated in Figure 8.2c is
correct.
Proof. We start with some special cases: the inputs (−0 + −0) (all ones)
and (0 + 0) (all zeroes) produce the correct output by inspection. For the
remaining cases the only way to get a sum of zero is if a and b are bitwise
complements of each other. Again, we see by inspection that the logic will
output a 1 for this case. If a and b are not bitwise complements, the only
way for the logic to output a 1 is if a = b = ±0, the special cases we already
discussed.
8.2 Quality of Results Comparisons
To evaluate the area and delay of our approach, we implemented our gate-level
designs with a 45 nm ARM standard cell library. Our focus is on minimum
area to minimize cost, so we selected the smallest (1×) standard cell for each
gate type for the modulo functional units. The longer delay of a modulo
shadow datapath simply increases error detection latency by a few cycles,
so this tradeoff is acceptable in return for reduced area cost. We compare
with other techniques compiled with the logic synthesis tool Synopsys Design
Compiler 2016.03-SP5-5 and also map modulo functional units from those
designs to 1× standard cells to enable meaningful comparisons.
8.2.1 Modulo Functional Units
Our first set of comparisons looks at the functional-unit level and compares our
designs for modulo adders, subtractors, reducers, and multipliers to equivalent
designs from Chapter 7. We implement a subtractor with a negation of one
input followed by an adder. In Chapter 7, the adder, subtractor, and multiplier
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Table 8.1: Functional-Unit Level Results
Functional Unit
Chapter 7 New Design Difference
Area Delay Area Delay Area Delay
m
o
d
-3
adder 8.3 0.09 12.8 0.13 53.7% 42.9%
subtractor 8.3 0.09 14.0 0.15 68.9% 60.4%
multiplier 4.5 0.04 17.8 0.16 299.3% 292.7%
32-bit reducer 177.8 0.73 155.6 0.39 −12.5% −47.1%
m
o
d
-7
adder 55.9 0.32 21.1 0.21 −62.3% −35.8%
subtractor 59.7 0.33 23.0 0.22 −61.6% −32.7%
multiplier 30.0 0.21 47.8 0.30 59.2% 42.3%
32-bit reducer 493.2 1.27 153.6 0.61 −68.8% −52.0%
m
o
d
-1
5 adder 188.0 0.46 29.3 0.27 −84.4% −41.6%
subtractor 192.8 0.53 31.9 0.29 −83.5% −46.0%
multiplier 133.4 0.51 90.4 0.42 −32.2% −16.8%
32-bit reducer 687.6 1.55 151.7 0.53 −77.9% −66.1%
are implemented with lookup tables, while a reducer is implemented as a tree
of modulo adders.
Table 8.1 shows the results of our comparisons. Area is measured in
µm2 while delay is measured in ns. We observe that our reducer designs,
which tend to be the dominant part of shadow datapath costs, provide lower
area and delay than those of Chapter 7. Even for the simplest modulo-3
reducer, we achieve a 12.5% reduction in area and a 47.1% reduction in delay.
Furthermore, this reducer cost is essentially fixed as the modulo base scales
because the number of full adders required is the same as the number of bits
reduced (w − n). Longer delays also increase the need for pipeline flip-flops
which in turn impacts area cost. Our other observation is that as we scale to
larger Mersenne bases, even the adders and subtractors and eventually the
multiplier become less costly than Chapter 7. This is expected due to the
exponential scaling nature of lookup tables in Chapter 7.
8.2.2 Self-Checking Multiply Accumulator
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of our approach to a self-
checking multiply-accumulator (MAC) illustrated in Figure 8.3a. The shadow
datapath is built from components introduced in Section 8.1: a full reducer
to n bits (Figure 8.1b), a partial reducer to 2n bits (omitting the final binary
adder in Figure 8.1b), a modulo multiplier matrix from Figure 8.2b (with
89
⨉+
%M %M
%M
= 0
n n
n2
2n
a b c
a ⨉ b + c error
%M
2n
2n
(a) Architecture
A
re
a 
O
ve
rh
ea
d 
(%
)
0
10
20
30
40
Modular width (bits)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8-bit 16-bit 32-bit 64-bit
(b) Area overhead
D
el
ay
 O
ve
rh
ea
d 
(M
A
C
 =
 1
)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Modular width (bits)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8-bit 16-bit 32-bit 64-bit
(c) Error delay
Figure 8.3: Self-checking multiply accumulator architecture and overhead
evaluation. M = 2n − 1.
NAND gates to negate the output), a negation inverter (Section 8.1.4), and
a zero comparator (Figure 8.2c). Note that the reducers are summation
reducers, so they function as adders.
Under error free conditions, the shadow datapath will compute −(a mod
M)(b mod M) and −(c mod M), add it to ab + c from the output, reduce
the result modulo M , and get a result of 0. Computation errors in either the
main or shadow datapath will generate a nonzero result (provided aliasing
does not occur, which in our experience is unlikely for single bit errors).
A key strategy in this design is the avoidance of reduction beyond 2n bits
(except for multiplier inputs) as reduction beyond 2n bits involves the use
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of half adders which do not directly provide bit reduction while the main
reduction process is mapped entirely to full adders. This strategy is similar
to the carry save technique used in standard binary integer arithmetic design.
We evaluated our MAC architecture by synthesizing the multiply accumu-
late main datapath with Design Compiler targeting minimum delay while
generating 1× gate-level designs for the shadow datapath with gate-level
architectural templates and Algorithm 2. QoR results for different width
datapaths and modulo widths (n) are shown in Figures 8.3b and 8.3c. We
observe 12–18% area overhead for a 32-bit self-checking MAC. We observe
error signal delays of about 2× the delay of the main datapath. As mentioned
at the start of this section, the longer delay of a modulo shadow datapath
simply increases error detection latency by a few cycles, and does not affect
the performance of the main datapath, so this tradeoff is acceptable in return
for reduced area cost.2
2For example, in Chapter 7, we used a pipelining strategy to run the shadow datapath
two cycles behind the main datapath without affecting performance.
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CHAPTER 9
CROSS-LAYER RESILIENCE SYNERGIES
In this chapter, we take shadow datapaths further by looking for cross-
layer synergies with other techniques for increasing reliability against soft
errors. We consider five different existing reliability improvement techniques:
algorithm based fault tolerance (ABFT) [46,47], error detection by duplicated
instructions (EDDI) [68], modulo-3 shadow datapaths (Chapter 7), parity
checkers at the logic synthesis level [38], and hardened flip-flop standard
cells [36,37]. ABFT, parity, and flip-flop hardening are the techniques that
demonstrated benefit in the CLEAR study [38]. EDDI protects all instructions
and variables through full, fine-grained duplication, and thus provides a
benchmark for maximum coverage through algorithm- or instruction-level
transformation. As discussed in Chapter 7, modulo-3 shadow datapaths is
a high-level synthesis technique that has demonstrated a 175× reliability
improvement at a low cost. We also consider useful combinations of these
techniques with a systematic feed-forward approach: applying higher-level
techniques first and then using lower-level techniques to fill in any reliability
gaps that remain.
To systematically evaluate these representative techniques and their combi-
nations, we developed an automated framework, shown in Figure 9.1, involving
high-level synthesis and full place-and-route physical design with our five
reliability transformations applied in their respective layers. We used an error
injection enabling netlist transformation and FPGA emulation to perform a
grand total of over 400,000 emulated flip-flop error injections across our 12
accelerator designs, one injection per accelerator execution. We also evaluated
runtime and energy overhead through the use of commercial simulation and
power estimation tools.
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Figure 9.1: Our cross-layer reliability framework.
9.1 Framework
Figure 9.1 provides an overview of our experimental framework which evaluates
the reliability and quality of results (QoR) of each of our reliability techniques
and combinations for each experimental accelerator design relative to an
unprotected baseline. The hardening and parity techniques are guided by
reliability evaluation for each individual flip-flop after application of the
higher-level techniques; they prioritize protecting the most vulnerable flip-
flops first. There is a feedback loop in the back end since the hardening and
parity techniques modify the physical design through an engineering change
order (ECO) process. We discuss reliability evaluation in Section 9.1.1, our
high-level synthesis “front-end” in Section 9.1.2, and our physical design
“back-end” and QoR analysis in Section 9.1.3. We introduce our reliability
techniques in Section 9.1.4 and discuss techniques for accelerator error recovery
in Section 9.1.5.
9.1.1 Reliability Evaluation
To evaluate the reliability of each of the 12 accelerator designs against flip-flop
soft errors, we start with a gate netlist as shown in Figure 9.1. We then
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run the netlist through an error injection enabling transformation which
inserts XOR gates at the “D” input to each flip-flop as shown in Figure 9.2.
One input of each XOR gate is connected to the corresponding original “D”
driving wire, while the other input is connected to an error injection controller,
which enables a bit flip to be injected into a specific flip-flop at a specific
cycle. We map this transformed netlist to an FPGA (Altera Stratix III) and
generate 10,000 random (cycle, flip-flop) pairs for each accelerator design.
Such random error injections at the flip-flop-level have been experimentally
shown to accurately model the behavior of soft errors in actual systems [69].
We then execute the accelerator on the FPGA with the same input 10,000
times, injecting one error from the list each time and recording the results for
all 10,000 runs.
FPGA emulated error injection is critical in order to evaluate large injected
error sample sizes, which in turn is important for accurately estimating the
reliability of a given design against all possible single flip-flop bit flips. In
our experiments, we find that FPGA emulated error injection is on the order
of 1,000-10,000× faster than RTL-level simulation. This speed enables us to
perform all of our experiments (a total of over 400,000 error injection runs
for the baseline and resilient designs) with approximately 40 FPGA-hours
of computation time. Running RTL simulations with the same sample size
would require a large CPU computation cluster.
There are three possible outcomes for each execution: correct, wrong, and
hang. “Correct” means that the accelerator produced the correct output with
the correct timing (output exactly matches a “gold” error-free run). In other
words, the error is masked. “Wrong” means that the accelerator output does
not match the error-free run, typically referred to as Silent Data Corruption
(SDC). “Hang” means that the accelerator was given twice the number of
cycles as the error-free run to finish, but failed to complete execution in that
time. Such hangs can be detected with existing watchdog techniques. We will
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focus on the “Wrong” outcomes or SDCs as these problems will go undetected
in an unprotected design and are thus the most pernicious effect of soft errors.
We used this reliability evaluation for unprotected baseline designs as well
as experimental designs with various reliability transforms applied. The
experimental accelerator designs may have an additional error output which
indicates that the accelerator has detected the error. If the error is detected,
we consider the accelerator to be protected against the corresponding injection
since it can respond by restarting its execution (see Section 9.1.5). Recording
the cycle count when the error signal is asserted allows us to also measure
the error detection latency for each error that is detected, calculated as the
number of cycles from when the error is injected to when the error signal is
raised.
Some reliability transforms may increase the number of flip-flops or the
accelerator runtime, which proportionally increases the soft error rate per
accelerator execution. Thus we use the following equations for reliability
improvement to model this effect:
SDC impr. =
Runtimebase × Flip-flopsbase
Runtime× Flip-flops ×
SDCbase
SDC
(9.1)
SDC =
Wrong, undetected outcomes
Total Errors Injected
(9.2)
where Runtime = Cycles×Frequency. Note that our error injection evaluation
framework cannot emulate hardened flip-flops on an FPGA. Instead we model
such hardening by scaling the wrong, undetected outcome count for just the
hardened flip-flops by dividing by the known soft error rate improvement of
the hardened flip-flop (see Section 9.1.4).
9.1.2 High-Level Synthesis
High-level synthesis enables us to take reliability methods previously applied to
software and retarget them for nonprogrammable custom hardware. Thus, we
start with software specifications for each of our accelerators and our hardware
synthesis process begins with high-level synthesis (HLS) [70], a process for
compiling a software design specification into custom hardware specialized to
execute exactly that software functionality and only that software functionality.
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study evaluating
effective software reliability methods as applied to hardware.
For our experiments, we used an in-house HLS engine leveraging the
LegUp [58] compilation process and scheduler, but with a custom binding
and RTL generation engine. As shown in Figure 9.1 the ABFT and EDDI
transforms are performed before HLS; the modulo-3 transform is integrated
into HLS; and the parity and hardening techniques are applied after HLS.
(Section 9.1.4 discusses these transforms individually.)
9.1.3 Physical Design
In order to accurately evaluate the physical design properties (i.e., area,
energy, and clock frequency) of each accelerator, synthesis and place-and-
route (SP&R) is run for each accelerator configuration (both before and after
adding resilience). For the ASIC design flow, accelerators are mapped to using
a commercial 28 nm technology library and SRAM compiler (the latter is used
to generate 2-port SRAM blocks for accelerator output). Synopsys design tools
(Design Compiler, IC Compiler, and Primetime) are used to perform synthesis,
place-and-route, and power analysis. It is crucial to evaluate area, power, and
timing impact post-layout in order to fully capture the impact of physical
design (i.e., impact of wire routing and timing constraints). Energy analysis
is performed by running VCS simulation (to generate accurate application
traces and switching activities for each accelerator) combined with timing
and power information obtained from IC Compiler and Primetime. For the
FPGA design flow, accelerators are mapped to and analyzed using the same
FPGA (Altera Stratix III) platform used for reliability evaluation.
9.1.4 Resilience Techniques
In the following subsections, we elaborate on our experimental resilience
techniques, which span the circuit-level to the algorithm-level. Of particular
interest are the traditionally software- and algorithm-level techniques applied
at the higher levels, since the software transforms in these techniques now
become architecture-level hardware transforms through the use of high-level
synthesis.
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Table 9.1: Hardened Flip-Flops
Type Soft Error Rate Area Delay Energy
Baseline 1 1 1 1
Light-Hardened
LEAP (LHL)
2.5× 10−1 1.2 1.2 1.3
LEAP-DICE 2× 10−4 2 1 1.8
Flip-Flop Hardening
Hardened flip-flops are flip-flops designed to tolerate radiation induced soft
errors [36,37]. Modifications to the flip-flop circuit and layout can reduce the
probability (by up to three orders of magnitude [37]) that a particle hit will
change the stored flip-flop state. These hardened flip-flops are incorporated
into the standard cell library, such that during synthesis and place-and-route,
existing (unhardened) flip-flops can be remapped and substituted on a one-
to-one basis with their resilient counterpart. It is important to note that the
hardened flip-flop design considered in this thesis (LEAP-DICE) tolerates
both single-event upsets (SEUs) and single-event multiple upsets (SEMUs),
which is not the case for all hardened designs. For instance, in DICE (a
traditional and well-known hardened flip-flop design) [71], a single particle
strike can cause multiple nodes within the DICE cell to flip (i.e., SEMU),
resulting in a state corruption. Applying LEAP layout modifications to
DICE enables the creation of a new hardened flip-flop (LEAP-DICE), the
latter which is tolerant to both SEUs and SEMUs. Compared to a baseline,
unprotected, flip-flop, LEAP-DICE provides a 5,000× reduction in Soft Error
Rate (SER) at 2× area, no delay, and 1.8× energy cost (as demonstrated
with radiation beam experiments conducted by [37]).
Flip-Flop Group Parity Checking
Flip-flop group parity checking is a logic layer technique implemented by
comparing the inputs and outputs for groups of flip-flops [72]. For radiation-
induced soft errors in flip-flops, it is sufficient to implement this checking
by utilizing an XOR-tree to calculate and compare the even-parity of the
inputs (predictor tree) to that of the outputs (checker tree), as shown in
Figure 9.3. In order to maintain the clock period, it may be necessary to add
additional flip-flops to pipeline the parity calculation in the predictor tree
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Pipeline flip-flops
Figure 9.3: Flip-flop group parity checking (no timing impact).
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%3
%3
Original datapath
Shadow datapath
+
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×
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Figure 9.4: Example modulo-3 shadow datapath. Units labeled “%3” are
mod-3 residue generators.
(to prevent disturbing critical paths). Implementation of the predictor and
checker trees is performed via automatic netlist modifications during synthesis
and place-and-route. The same design heuristics described in [38] are used to
enable cost-effective implementations of parity checking that ensure no clock
speed impact and mitigate the impact of SEMUs.
Modulo-3 Shadow Datapaths
Modulo-3 shadow datapath checking, as discussed in detail in Chapter 7, is a
high-level synthesis technique for checking the computation of an arithmetic
datapath involving multiple inputs, outputs, and operations. The technique
works by creating a “shadow datapath” that performs the same computation as
the main datapath, but with modulo-3 residues as illustrated in Figure 9.4. As
there are only three unique values in modulo-3 space: 0, 1, and 2, the shadow
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datapath is a lightweight version of the main datapath with 2-bit registers and
2-bit operations (such as mod-3 addition and multiplication labeled +3 and
×3 in Figure 9.4). These 2-bit operations are a key advantage of modulo-3
checksums over parity checksums: the ability to perform lightweight checksum
prediction through an entire datapath. In particular, checksum predictions
for addition, subtraction, and multiplication are cheap 2-bit operations for
modulo-3 checksums but are expensive for parity checksums.
Thus, while the parity technique puts each flip-flop needing protection
into a parity group to protect them explicity ; modulo-3 residue generators
and checkers are only needed at inputs and outputs of an arithmetic core,
respectively, to implicitly protect all of the flip-flops in that core. We also
use the high-level synthesis optimizations discussed in Chapter 7 that further
reduce cost through intelligent checkpoint scheduling and binding to share a
minimum allocation of modulo-3 residue generators.
In some parts of a datapath, non-arithmetic components such as bitwise
logic and shifts may be present. We leave flip-flops in these non-arithmetic
parts of the datapath unprotected instead of duplicating them as in Chapter 7.
Similarly, we leave the state machine unprotected. The intuition here is that
downstream parity and flip-flop hardening techniques provide a fine brush to
cover these coverage gaps in a more cost-effective manner.
Instruction Duplication
Error Detection by Duplicated Instructions (EDDI) is a software technique
that detects errors through comparison of redundant execution of instructions
using separate register and memory partitions [8, 68]. Instruction duplication
is implemented using LLVM compiler modifications before high-level synthesis
to automatically transform applications to partition the memory space and
add the duplicated instructions. The transform also inserts consistency checks
between variables and their duplicates, which we pass to a custom check
function. We modify our HLS engine to translate these check function calls
to logic that asserts an output error signal whenever a consistency check fails.
By using a custom check function that generates datapath hardware in our
HLS tailored version of EDDI, we avoid the need for conditional branches
or other control flow instructions to check for errors found in the software
reference transforms in [8, 68].
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Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance
Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) is an algorithm-layer technique
that can only be applied to specific operations and algorithms to either detect
or detect and correct errors [46, 47, 73, 74]. Fortunately, many accelerators
are particularly amenable to ABFT modifications due to their prevalent use
of matrix operations and other linear computations. For example, a matrix
multiplication algorithm can be modified to add an additional column/row
checksum to each input matrix, which allows for the resulting output check-
sums to be used to detect or correct an error in the output matrix. Note that,
typically, ABFT manifests as software-only modifications (e.g., no hardware
overhead) without additional performance impact in the common case to im-
plement correction (for algorithms in which correction is possible). However,
since ABFT is subsequently mapped into hardware checkers for the purposes
of generating resilient accelerators, accelerator algorithms were modified to
only provide detection capability; thus, saving on additional hardware over-
head that would be required in order to provide correction capability. This
tradeoff is acceptable for hardware accelerators since they can be restarted
when a soft error occurs to effectively correct the error (see Section 9.1.5).
9.1.5 Recovery
To have an end-to-end resilient accelerator, errors need not only be detected
but must also be corrected (i.e., recovered). Since the majority of resilience
techniques (aside from hardened flip-flops, which perform in-place correction
by mitigating the effect of soft errors) have been implemented using detection-
only mechanics, an additional recovery mechanism is required. However, a
beneficial property of accelerators is that they perform fixed-function compu-
tation without external interference (other than to receive input data prior to
computation and to transmit output data at completion). In other words, the
accelerator inputs essentially provide a snapshot of the accelerator state at the
start of execution. As long as the accelerator input memories are protected
(we assume memories are protected by existing coding techniques), this snap-
shot will not be corrupted and a “restore” of this snapshot can be achieved
by resetting the accelerator (using existing reset signal(s)) and triggering
another accelerator start (using existing control signal(s)). Thus, recovery
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Table 9.2: Average Cost and Benefit Across All 12 Accelerators for
Individual Techniques Relative to Baseline
Tech-
nique
Overhead
SDC
Improv.
Avg. Det.
Latency
(cycles)
Area Energy Freq. Runtime
LEAP-
DICE
0-2.2% 0-8.8% 0% 0% 1-500× n/a
Parity 0-3.8% 0-10.6% 0% 0% 1-500× 2
Mod-3 1.7% 3.5% 0.3% 0% 4.3× 732
EDDI 27.6% 33% 2.8% 42.7% 57.4× 7,399
ABFT 11.9% 23.8% 1.4% 8.5% 22.2× 265,980
is simply a matter of restarting computation once an error is detected (with
only minimal error signal routing cost and negligible performance impact of
re-execution given the rarity of a soft error event). This unique structure of
application-specific accelerators serves as a partition between the accelerator
and the external environment (input, even streaming input, can be stored
until consumed and output can be held until validated), thus making the
recovery mechanism described feasible, reasonable, and sufficient.
9.2 Results and Analysis
We explore and architect resilience for 12 accelerator designs: atax, bicg,
floyd-warshall,1 gemm, gemver, gesummv, matrix, matrix-tiled, mvt,
symm, syr2k, and syrk. These accelerators are derived from software kernels
in the PolyBench benchmark suite [66] involving linear algebra and dynamic
programming. Since these kernels involve heavily nested loops that are com-
putationally intensive, they are good candidates for oﬄoading to accelerators.
Our focus is on the linear algebra kernels since those applications are amenable
to ABFT techniques involving matrix row and column checksums [47]. We
also wrote a simple version of the gemm generalized matrix multiply kernel
that performs only a matrix multiply that we call matrix and implemented
a tiled version called matrix-tiled that performs the computation in 4× 4
tile chunks to improve performance at the cost of area.
1floyd-warshall does not have a corresponding ABFT transform.
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9.2.1 Individual Techniques
It is important to first understand how individual resilience techniques per-
form standalone (the hardware costs, properties, and resilience improvement
afforded by each technique in isolation). Table 9.2 provides an overview
of the average QoR cost overhead and resilience benefit of each individual
technique when applied to each of the 12 accelerators mapped to the ASIC
platform. Costs and improvement values were generated experimentally using
the physical design and reliability evaluation components of our framework
as described in Section 9.1. Since LEAP-DICE and parity checking can be
selectively applied to flip-flops to achieve tunable resilience improvement, we
report the average cost range and corresponding improvement range. From
Table 9.2, it can be seen that software- and algorithm-level techniques (i.e.,
EDDI and ABFT) do not translate into cost-effective hardware checkers.
In general, although these two techniques provide a high degree of SDC
improvement, the area and energy costs for achieving this improvement is
greater than the cost of protecting every single flip-flop using LEAP-DICE,
for example.
9.2.2 Combined Techniques
With a greater understanding of the properties of individual resilience tech-
niques, we can explore the cross-layer design space and analyze the benefits
attained through interesting combinations of resilience techniques. Tables 9.3–
9.6 present our cross-layer cost-effectiveness results for both the ASIC and
FPGA platforms. Combinations of multiple resilience techniques are com-
pared against the tunable, single-layer solutions (e.g., LEAP-DICE hardening
and parity checking). Single-layer solutions are applied in a selective manner
and guided using cross-layer analysis (error masking and propagation through
the system stack guide implementation decisions).
Similar to [38], cross-layer combinations are created in a top-down fashion
where higher-level techniques (e.g., ABFT, EDDI, and modulo-3) are applied
first before subsequently augmenting resilience with lower-level techniques
(e.g., parity and LEAP-DICE), as needed in order to achieve the desired SDC
improvement. Additionally, selective insertion of parity and LEAP-DICE
utilizes the heuristics found in [38] (e.g., critical path, flip-flop location, and
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Table 9.3: Average ASIC Cost (area/energy) vs. SDC Improvement for Various Combinations Across 12 Accelerators
Type
SDC Improvement
2× 5× 10× 50× 500×
LEAP-DICE 0.9% / 3.3% 1.2% / 5.0% 1.4% / 5.9% 1.7% / 7.0% 2.2% / 8.8%
Parity checking 1.4% / 4.4% 2.2% / 6.4% 2.6% / 7.3% 3.1% / 8.7% 3.4% / 10.6%
Parity + LEAP-DICE 0.6% / 2.7% 1.0% / 3.9% 1.1% / 5.0% 1.3% / 5.7% 1.7% / 7.4%
Mod-3 + parity + LEAP-DICE 0.7% / 3.6% 2.3% / 4.7% 2.6% / 5.7% 2.9% / 6.5% 3.3% / 8.1%
EDDI + parity + LEAP-DICE 27.6% / 33.0% 27.6% / 33.2% 27.6% / 33.2% 27.6% / 33.4% 28.3% / 34.0%
ABFT + parity + LEAP-DICE 11.9% / 23.8% 12.2% / 24.1% 12.2% / 24.1% 12.3% / 24.2% 12.3% / 24.8%
Table 9.4: ASIC Cost (area/energy) for a 50× SDC Improvement Using Various Combinations Across 12 Accelerators
Benchmark LEAP-DICE Parity P+L Mod3+P+L EDDI+P+L ABFT+P+L
atax 3.1% / 10.7% 8.3% / 16.2% 2.8% / 10.0% 8.4% / 14.7% 33.0% / 37.5% 27.3% / 85.2%
bicg 4.2% / 15.1% 7.5% / 15.7% 3.5% / 10.9% 9.6% / 14.5% 46.7% / 88.9% 11.7% / 19.4%
floyd-warsh 1.0% / 3.7% 1.2% / 3.7% 0.7% / 2.5% 1.5% / 6.1% 18.2% / 54.8% – / –
gemm 0.3% / 3.1% 0.4% / 2.1% 0.3% / 1.6% 0.3% / 1.7% 7.1% / 9.5% 3.7% / 21.2%
gemver 0.2% / 1.5% 0.4% / 1.9% 0.2% / 1.1% 0.4% / 0.7% 27.6% / 15.0% 10.0% / 5.2%
gesummv 4.2% / 10.1% 4.8% / 14.9% 2.6% / 8.9% 2.5% / 9.0% 61.0% / 32.7% 11.5% / 14.1%
matrix 3.3% / 12.2% 6.6% / 17.4% 2.6% / 10.8% 5.4% / 11.1% 27.3% / 42.4% 11.6% / 43.4%
matrix-tiled 0.3% / 1.4% 0.4% / 1.6% 0.2% / 0.9% 0.3% / 1.1% 20.4% / 35.8% 8.2% / 30.1%
mvt 1.1% / 11.5% 2.6% / 12.7% 1.1% / 8.3% 2.5% / 6.5% 56.9% / 37.0% 37.8% / 37.8%
symm 1.1% / 6.6% 2.5% / 8.8% 0.9% / 6.0% 1.6% / 6.2% 14.7% / 24.6% 2.3% / 18.6%
syr2k 0.9% / 3.8% 1.5% / 4.5% 0.9% / 3.8% 1.4% / 3.9% 4.3% / 34.1% 1.3% / 24.8%
syrk 0.5% / 3.9% 1.2% / 4.8% 0.4% / 3.1% 0.8% / 3.6% 15.5% / 32.2% 12.3% / 44.3%
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Table 9.5: Average FPGA Cost (LUT area/energy) vs. SDC Improvement for Various Combinations Across 12 Accelerators
Type
SDC Improvement
2× 5× 10× 50× 500×
Parity checking 9.2% / 4.1% 16.6% / 8.5% 20.4% / 12.4% 25.6% / 22.3% 27.8% / 20.5%
Modulo-3 + parity 26.7% / 19.2% 31.8% / 21.1% 34.1% / 26.6% 39.3% / 35.2% 43.1% / 38.5%
EDDI + parity 107.3% / 174.7% 107.3% / 174.7% 107.3% / 174.7% 107.5% / 174.3% 107.7% / 167.4%
ABFT + parity 95.0% / 87.7% 99.0% / 94.2% 101.9% / 95.6% 104.7% / 93.7% 106.9% / 97.0%
Table 9.6: FPGA Cost (LUT area/energy) for a 50× SDC Improvement Using Various Combinations Across 12 Accelerators
Benchmark Parity Mod3+Parity EDDI+Parity ABFT+Parity
atax 20.4% / 22.8% 31.6% / 32.0% 120.9% / 143.2% 125.5% / 136.4%
bicg 27.3% / 36.5% 26.3% / 29.2% 85.5% / 162.3% 56.6% / 39.5%
floyd-warsh 25.5% / 29.9% 48.5% / 72.0% 91.9% / 154.2% – / –
gemm 26.4% / 29.4% 28.8% / 35.9% 88.9% / 239.4% 106.3% / 95.3%
gemver 13.9% / 21.5% 41.9% / 38.7% 177.2% / 247.7% 122.2% / 92.1%
gesummv 24.9% / 18.9% 33.4% / 18.3% 81.0% / 147.6% 97.2% / 57.6%
matrix 26.9% / 12.6% 34.6% / 27.2% 48.5% / 82.0% 84.8% / 69.9%
matrix-tiled 30.0% / 19.6% 46.2% / 30.2% 169.4% / 240.3% 23.9% / 12.6%
mvt 20.2% / 17.4% 91.1% / 60.1% 77.1% / 95.3% 220.6% / 189.7%
symm 25.6% / 18.1% 28.2% / 44.5% 115.4% / 255.8% 71.6% / 55.5%
syr2k 34.4% / 20.2% 22.5% / 18.5% 123.4% / 161.3% 104.6% / 100.0%
syrk 31.5% / 20.6% 38.1% / 16.3% 110.4% / 163.1% 138.6% / 181.9%
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parity group size aware optimization) to ensure the lowest cost technique is
chosen while maintaining design frequency.
Since our cross-layer methodology and framework allows designers to tune
resilience improvement targets that may vary depending on the intended
domain, Tables 9.3 and 9.5 present the average costs for achieving specific
resilience improvements using various combinations when averaged over all
12 accelerators mapped to the ASIC and FPGA platforms respectively. This
average provides an overall picture of the cost-effectiveness of various combina-
tions. Note that flip-flop hardening is not applicable to FPGA programming
as FPGAs are programmable at the logic level and above, not the physical
level.
From Table 9.3 it is clear that, generally, a combination of parity checking
and LEAP-DICE is the most cost-effective for the ASIC platform. This
efficiency is due to the fact that logic parity and LEAP-DICE selectively
protect individual flip-flops, resulting in fine-grained protection of the exact
flip-flops that are most vulnerable (determined via accurate flip-flop-level
error injection described in Section 9.1.1). Additionally, this property of
selective protection also helps explain why protection using LEAP-DICE-only
yields resilient accelerators at roughly 1.5% additional area and energy cost
compared to the cost-effective solution of LEAP-DICE and parity checking.
For the FPGA platform, Table 9.5 shows that parity is the most cost-effective
in general.
It is interesting to note that while techniques like EDDI and ABFT do
provide high degrees of SDC improvement (Table 9.2), even cross-layer combi-
nations involving these techniques do not yield cost-effective solutions. This
is due to the fact that the costs for implementing the necessary hardware
checkers for these techniques dominate. In fact, the area and energy costs for
the checkers alone are more than the cost of implementing an over-designed
resilient accelerator that protects every flip-flop using LEAP-DICE.
One interesting exception is the matrix-tiled benchmark mapped to the
FPGA, where the ABFT + parity dominates the other techniques in area
and energy cost. This benchmark is a matrix-matrix multiply, the canonical
computation for ABFT application, in parallelized 4 × 4 tile chunks. We
find that the high functional-unit resource usage of the benchmark makes the
accelerator large, effectively compensating for the ABFT overheads.
In general, it is very difficult to find a more cost-effective resilience solution
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than using a combination of parity and LEAP-DICE (or either parity or LEAP-
DICE alone). However, for two specific ASIC hardware accelerators (gemver
and mvt), a combination of modulo-3, parity, and LEAP-DICE was able to
yield marginal energy savings for all resilience improvements when compared
to a combination of parity and LEAP-DICE. For the FPGA platform, we
find four accelerators where mod3+parity has an advantage over parity alone:
bicg, gesummv, syr2k, and syrk. In general, the modulo-3 technique works
well for arithmetic-oriented datapaths with sufficient arithmetic complexity
to compensate for the cost of modulo-3 residue generators on the inputs and
outputs (a 32-bit residue generator occupies about the same area as a 32-bit
adder).
Tables 9.4 and 9.6 provide a detailed expansion for the costs to achieve a
50× SDC improvement with various combinations of techniques for all 12
accelerators studied for the ASIC and FPGA platforms respectively.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 we introduced the H-QED technique and its hy-
brid tracing and hybrid hashing variations which utilize HLS principles for
quickly detecting bugs inside hardware accelerators in SoCs in both pre-silicon
debugging and post-silicon validation scenarios. Our results demonstrate
the effectiveness and practicality of H-QED: up to two orders of magnitude
improvement in error detection latency, up to a threefold improvement in
coverage, less than 10% accelerator-level overhead, and negligible performance
overhead. In our pre-silicon hybrid tracing variation, we demonstrate that the
technique can pinpoint the source-code location of logic bug activation and
provide a strong hint for potential bug fixes to the hardware designer. Further-
more, these techniques also discovered previously unknown bugs in the widely
used CHStone HLS benchmark suite. Through hybrid hardware/software
traces and signatures, our techniques minimize intrusiveness during validation.
Thus, the combination of QED and hybrid tracing/hashing provides a sys-
tematic approach to validation of complex SoCs consisting of processor cores,
uncore components, programmable accelerators, and hardware accelerators.
Future directions related to H-QED include:
 Use of H-QED for a wide variety of high-level descriptions beyond C
and C++ (e.g., various domain-specific languages)
 Use of H-QED for programmable accelerators
In our modulo-3 shadow datapath work in Chapter 7 we have designed
and implemented a fully automated high-level synthesis process to create
error-detecting cores capable of detecting an average of 99.42% of unmasked
errors for an assortment of three different kinds of fault models with negligible
delay cost, 25.7% area cost, and a detection latency 4150× faster than an
end result check. We have taken the first step toward the fully automated
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generation of low area cost, low development cost reliable hardware through
high-level synthesis. We also explored a rollback recovery method for soft
errors with an additional area cost of 28% through which we achieve up to a
175× increase in reliability against soft errors. Future directions related to
this research include:
 Adding support for floating-point operations
 Fixing timing errors through rollback combined with frequency-voltage
scaling
In Chapter 8, we took a dive into the gate-level design of modulo functional
units with the goal of reducing their cost with gate-level architectural opti-
mizations. We introduced new gate-level architectures for Mersenne modulo
functional units targeting shadow datapaths for reliability, including a modulo
reduction algorithm that maps entirely to full adders and new adder and
multiplier designs based on integer counterparts with a wraparound twist.
We compared our functional units to the previous state-of-the-art approach
in Chapter 7, observing a 12.5% reduction in area and a 47.1% reduction
in delay for a 32-bit mod-3 reducer; that our reducer costs, which tend to
dominate shadow datapath costs, do not increase with larger modulo bases;
and that for modulo-15 and above, all of our modulo functional units have
better area and delay then their previous counterparts. We also demonstrated
the practicality of our approach with a self-checking multiply accumulate
design, which has an overhead of only 12% for a 32-bit main datapath and
2-bit modulo-3 shadow datapath. Future directions for this research include:
 Extending support for modulo bases beyond Mersenne numbers
 Support for fixed-point arithmetic
 Gate-level automation through integration into a logic synthesis engine
 Integration into the high-level synthesis approach of Chapter 7
In Chapter 9, we took a step back and looked at the reliability problem
from a cross-layer perspective. We built a first-of-its-kind, comprehensive
framework to explore the problem of designing application specific hardware
accelerators resilient against radiation-induced flip-flop soft errors on both
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the ASIC and FPGA platforms, considering combinations of five existing
techniques at different levels of abstraction ranging from the circuit-level
to the algorithm-level including modulo-3 shadow datapaths. We applied
algorithm- and instruction-level techniques, which are traditionally applied to
software, to hardware through high-level synthesis. We found that, in general,
a combination of parity checking and LEAP-DICE hardened flip-flops are
the most cost-effective. For some arithmetic-oriented accelerators, adding
modulo-3 shadow datapaths to this combination results in some additional
benefit, even without considering its combinational logic, stuck-at fault, and
timing error protection benefits. We also found that ABFT in the context of
high-level synthesis incurs significant costs due to additional memory bits and
memory accesses required for storing checksum data, which is not a significant
problem in a software context.
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